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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Classification of Behavior Disorders
Classification is a necessary first step in the development of any science.

Without it, the interrelationsnips of

empirical events go unrecognized.

The process of classifi-

cation, however, can be extremely difficult.

One of zhe

principal reasons for this is that the methods or dimensions
by which events are to be classified are not easily identified,

and when they are, their nosological utility is often

the subject of heated disagreement.

In the fields of clinical psychology and psychiatry
the problems of classification have been especially evident.

In these areas classification has proceeded mainly as an

attempt to emulate and apply the well accepted framework of
the medical model to behavior disorders.

Consistent with

medical objectives, the purpose of classification or

diagnosis has been conceptualized as representing an
initial step in tne determination of etiology, as a pre-

dictor of outcome and prognosis, and as an indicator of

appropriate treatm.ent.

Voluminous criticism has been

directed against the validity of this "disease model"
system of nosology (Ullman & K.rasner,

1965), but lest a

2

potentially valuable system be abandoned prematurely, it
is important that dissatisfaction bred by impatience
not

be confused with invalidity.

The subtleties and complex-

ities of human behavior are such that it would be unrealistic to expect a meaningful nosology to develop without a
long and intense expenditure of effort.

The reliability as well as validity of psychiatric

nosology also has been criticized (Maher, 1966; Nathan,
1967)

.

On the basis of a review of relevant research,

Eysenck (1960) concluded that the correlations of diagnoses
made independently by different psychiatrists were too low
to be acceptable as descriptive statements of the patients

who were being examined.

Eysenck went on to state that

this was in no small part due to the low reliability of
the ratings made of the symptoms which entered into the

various syndromes.
If one thing is clear,

it

is that there is a good

deal of dissatisfaction with the present system of psychiatric nosology.

Some critics go so far to question the

fundamental need for psychiatric classification; and
though their objections do have some validity, there are

counterarguments.

One frequently voiced objection

1966; Zigler & Phillips,

1961)

(Maher,

is that no two class members
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are exactly alike and assignment to
a group ignores the

uniqueness of the members,

in addition,

classification

does not concern itself with process or
how an individual

member of the class changes over time.

The counterargu-

ment to this concern with loss of uniqueness
points out
that assignment to class membership should represent

a

compensatory gain in the knowledge of attributes and
correlates that go along with class membership, and that
the loss of individual characteristics is minimized if

only irrelevant aspects are deleted from the classification
schema.

What is relevant, however, and what is irrelevant

is not always easily determined.

Another common criticism of diagnosis is that diagnostic classes encompass heterogeneous groups of people

varying in symptoraology, prognosis, etiology, etc.

This

criticism fails to realize that considered within a classification system is the notion of a broad group which

includes subgroups.

For exam.ple, schizophrenia may be

considered the main group with the various forms of schiz-

ophrenia considered as subgroups, in which case the concept schizophrenia could not be criticized on the basis

that all its m.embers do not share all attributes, although

obviously they share

sorre

attributes.

.
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Accepting then, in principle at least, the potential
value of psychiatric classification, a pertinent question would be to ask how the present system could be

improved.

Some thoughts on this question have been pre-

sented by Zigler & Phillips (1961) and, because of their
clarity, they are quoted here:

The amount of descriptive effort required
before etiological factors are likely to be discovered has been underestimated and the pursuit
of etiology should represent an end point rather
than a beginning for classif icatory systems.
The process of moving from an em.pirical
orientation to an etiological one is of
necessity inferential and therefore susceptible
to the myriad dangers of premature inference.
We propose that the greatest safeguard against
such prematurity is not to be found in the
scrapping of an empirical descriptive approach,
but in an accelerated program of empirical
research. What is needed at this time is a
systematic, empirical attack on the problemi
of mental disorders.
Inherent in this program
is the employm.ent of symptoms broadly defined
as meaningful and discernible behaviors as the
basis of a classif icatory system [p. 616]

Zigler stresses the need for more active research

focusing on the descriptive aspects of mental disorders.
If diagnosis is to be useful, its descriptive referents

This

must be less vague and inconsistent than at present.

study has been designed, in part, to deal with Zigler

's

comments, its intention being to focus on the behavior
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disorder sociopathic personality and to examine
experiitentally the validity of several of its
descriptive

criteria.

At the same time, it is the intent of the

stiidy to provide more substantive

knowledge about these

criteria, and thereby to go beyond the one-dimensionality
of the brief statements generally used to characterize

this disorder.

History of Sociooathy
In order that the reader may better understand the

present form of the concept of sociopathy, the developir^nt
of the concept is traced in this section.

the outset,

It will help at

to avoid confusion, to make it clear how the

concept is currently described.
tric nomenclature
has adopted the

The most recent psychia-

(American Psychiatric Association,

nam.e

1968)

antisocial personality to describe

what in this paper has been called sociopathic personality,

Because of the tenacious popularity of the

term.s

psycho-

path and sociopath they are used here interchangeably with

antisocial personality.

The following description is from

the diagnostic manual:

This term anti-social personality is reserved
for individuals v;ho are basically unsocialized
and whose behavior pattern brings them repeatedly into conflict v;ith society. They are
incapable of significant loyalty to individuals.

groups, or social values. They are grossly
selfish, callous, irresponsible, impulsive^
and unable to feel guilt or to learn frora
experience and punishment. Frustration
tolerance is low. They tend to blame others
or offer plausible rationalizations for their
behavior. A mere history of repeated social
offenses is not sufficient to justify this
diagnosis [p. 43],

The first clinical description of the sociopath comes
to us from the observations of Pinel

(Kavka,

1949)

who

described the unusual behavior of a young aristocrat who
was prone to extreme fits of anger.

If a dog, or horse, or

other animal offended him he would instantly put it to death.
At one time he became so enraged at a woman that he threw

her into a

^A;ell.

Pinel gives us

som.e

background inf ormiation,

telling us that this young man was the son of a weak and
indulgent mother who encouraged the gratification of her
son's every caprice and desire.

He referred to the condition

exhibited by this young man as "Manie Sans Delire":

"I was

not a little surprised to find many maniacs who at no

period gave evidence of any lesion of the understanding, but

who were under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury,
as if the active faculties alone sustained the injury
[p.

462]

By today's standards, Pinel'
too inclusive,

lurr.ping

s

"Manie Sans Delire" is

together several psychiatric
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categories.

His classic exairple cited above
would probably

be more accurately described as
an acting-out neurotic.

His observations, however, served as
an important step in
the direction of considering the
psychopathic state as a

separate mental disorder.
In England in 1635, J. C. Prit chard coined
the phrase

"moral insanity" to describe an individual who
"is found

to be incapable not of reasoning upon any subject
proposed
to him but of conducting himself with decency and
propriety
in the business of life

[McCord & McCord,

1964,

p.

24]."

Pritchard's concept, like Pinel's, was overly inclusive
compared to the contemporary picture of the sociopath,

including such disorders as manic-depressive psychosis
under his label "moral insanity."

It was Pritchard's con-

cept of moral insanity that was the precursor of the concept
of social or moral defectives,

or moral imbeciles, developed

in the later work of British writers.

In 1378 Gouster

(iMcCord & McCord,

1964)

presented the

first clinical picture of the symptoms found in moral insanity:

longstanding moral perversion; a delight in mis-

chief, excitement, and passion; enfeebled judgment; and

certain abnormal physical proportions.

Only these last two

points would seem to be in disagreement with the present-day

.
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conceptualization.

By the 1870 's Pritchard's concept of moral insanity
had become increasingly popular and controversial
1941)

.

(Maughs,

Its supporters contended that a separate moral

sense existed within the mind which could be split into

intellectual and moral spheres, and still others felt that
the intellect was always affected in mental illness and

therefore insanity could not exist without

som.e

intellectual

impairment

The inevitable entanglement of the concept of socio-

pathy with legal and religious questions postponed its progress towards being considered a separate entity until the
turn of the century when interest shifted away from theoretical considerations to observations of the sociopath himself.

In America, the term moral insanity was replaced by

"psychopathic inferiority" suggested by Koch in 1888
(Partridge,

1930)

.

Koch implied that the disorder was

caused by a constitutional predisposition; and, in time,

constitutional psychopathy gained wide use.
things took a slightly different turn.

In England,

The concept of

moral insanity served as a point of departure, with the

theoretical conflicts previously associated with the term

being relatively ignored.

As reported in Partridge's
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review (1930)

,

Tregold spoke of an inner defect of moral

sense and wisdom with strong antisocial tendencies.

Sullivan viewed the conduct of the moral im.becile as
patently absurd, "he lacks the essential quality of common
sense.

The moral imbecile is apt to engage in

-./rong

doing

for pleasure rather than profit, is usually an incorrigible

thief and liar, and is apt to show early in life a many
sided perversity of disposition.

In all cases there is a

common trait of insensibility with respect to the

rt.oral

quality involved, with consequent incapacity for expressing
shame or remorse [Partridge, 1930.

p.

67]."

Sullivan's

description is much like present conceptions of the sociopath

.

The concept of sociopathy has had a long history of

confusion surrounding its development.

This confusion has

come not only from the inadequate delimiting of the

behavioral phenomenon in question, but also from the
plethora of term.s and subtypes that have been used at one
time or another to refer to the sociopath.

attempts have been

m.ade to

A number of

divide the classification of

sociopathy into subgroups, but rather than clarifying the
concept, they have only helped to befuddle the issue, since

these attempts based their subgrouping primarily on arbitrary
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and superficial distinctions.

A few of the

niany systerv.s

are given below:

K r aepelin

Schneider

(McCord & McCord,

the excitable
the unstable
J. -cne impulsive
4. the eccentric
5. the liars and
1.
2.

swindlers
6. the antisocial
7. the quarrelsoir.e

1964)

Partridge

(McCord & McCord,
^ne
the
the
the
4. the
5. the
6. the
1.
^.
2.
3.

1964)

hyperthyrnic
nyperthyinic

depressed
insecure
fanatic
se If-seeking
emotionally
unstable
7. the exploitative
8. the affect less
9. the weak-willed
10. the asthenic

As recently as 1942, Henderson (1942)
types:

(1)

predominantly aggressive,

adequate, and

(3)

(2)

predominantly creative.

(193Q)
l.
2.
3

.

delinquent
inadequate
those with
general
incompatibility

identified three

predominantly inThough his tri-

partite division contributed little, Henderson's description
of the psychopath is generally consistent with more recant

formulations.

He described him as an individual who has

remained at an imanature, egocentric level, and who lacks
persistence of effort and is unable to profit from experience.

One notable disagreement with the contemporary pic-

ture of the psychopath is Henderson's statem.ent that,

"Their conduct throughout their lives has been punctuated

by disturbing episodes which have given rise to great
anxiety

[p.

466]."

This is not consistent with the picture

,
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of the psychopath as guiltless,
affectless, and devoid of

remorse

Contributing to the general perplexity surrounding
the
concept of psychopathy has been the over
inclusiveness of
the concept.

For example, Kahn (1931), whose book

Psychopathic Personality was for more than a decade
regarded as the chief exposition on the subject, listed
sixteen types of psychopaths.

The disorders included in

Kahn's book included all the familiar psychoneurotic
reactions as well as a variety of other behavior disorders, and, ironically,

little can be found in this book

which relates to the psychopath himself.

Ever since the concept of psychopathy was first described by Pinel, it has had the uncanny quality of being
called by different names.

In his historical review.

Partridge (1930) identified approximately a dozen terms
more or less synonoraous in their use.

They include con-

stitutional inferior, constitutional psychopathic personality,

psychopath, constitutional psychopath, constitutional

psychopathic state, moral imbecile, constitutional defective,

defective delinquents, emotionally unstable or inferior,
neurotic constitution, and instinct character.

In his

review of psychopathy, Maughs (1941) was able to come up

.
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with seventeen terins, including son^thing
called a psychosatipath
With all the confusion surrounding the concept
of
sociopathy,

it is not surprising that an occasional
author

has suggested that the concept be done away with.

One

psychiatrist wrote, "The term psychopathic personality as

commonly understood is useless in psychiatric research.
It does not refer to a specific behavioral entity.

It

serves as a scrap-basket to which is relegated a group of

otherwise unclassified personality disorders and problems
[In McCord & McCord,

1964,

p.

29]."

Kinbeirg says the same

thing a little more strongly, "The concept should be

abrogated as theoretically unsatisfactory, practically

misleading and destructive to scientific thinking [McCord &
McCord, 1964,

p.

2],"

Through the clouding confusion and disagreerrent the
concept of sociopathy hung on, and by the early 1900

's

observers had begun to refine and delimit the concept.
1906, Meyer excluded hysteria, psychasthenia,

thenia from the concept

(Partridge,

1930)

.

In

and neuras-

Birnbauro

(1917)

pointed out that criminal behavior per se was not psychopathic, nor did psychopaths necessarily exhibit intellectual

defects.

By the end of World War

I,

the consensus was that
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psychopathy was a discrete disorder
inanifested by strong
criminal tendencies apparently not deterred
by punishment.

By the 1930s the term "constitutional
inferior"
seemed to be falling into disrepute as being
too ambiguous,
too comprehensive, and too indefinite
regarding the

boundaries between abnormal and normal.

Not to be undone

by his predecessors, Partridge (1930) offered his
own
contribution to the names that had already amassed around
the concept of psychopathy.

He coined the terms "essential

sociopath" and "sociopath."

Partridge indicated that

schemas of the psychopath at that time placed him in a

coordinate position with the mental deficiencies, and that

psychopathy as it was being used in its more inclusive
sense referred to deep and chronic malad justm.ent

.

The

principal characteristic of Partridge's "essential sociopath" is persistent and consistent antisocial behavior

which is extremely resistant to change.

Partridge went

on to propose that the sociopath appears in two varieties:
as the antisocial personality par excellence,

and as a

member of a great class of socially deviated persons who
do not manifest any major personality deficiency.

A challenge to the concept of psychopathy that began
in 1930 and which,

to an abated degree, has continued to
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the present is the question of the
presence of intrapsychic

conflicts (Jenkins, 1960).

In 1930, Franz Alexander pre-

sented his classic paper on the neurotic
character in

which he relegated the concept of psychopathy
to the sub-

ordinate position of one among many neuroses.

As such,

the psychopath's behavior was understood in terms of
the

interplay of id, ego, and superego (Alexander, 1930).

According to Alexander, the seeming guiltlessness of the
psychopath's behavior is only apparent.

On an uncon-

scious level, the psychopath is seeking self punishment
(Gurvitz,

1951).

Alexander's position maintains that the

psychopath lives out his impulses, and that the strength
of his ego is less than other neurotics principally be-

cause of the overwhelming power of his impulses.

Though most social scientists today believe that

Alexander's theory depicts the personality of the acting
out neurotic rather than the true psychopath

McCord,

1964)

supporters.

,

(McCord &

his position has not been without its

After studying the cases of fifty psycho-

paths. Partridge

(1928)

concluded that the psychopath is

one in whom strong dem.ands are accompanied by feelings of

inadequacy, inferiority and insecurity.

Bromberg (1948)

argued that the dynamic psychopathoLogy of the so-called
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psychopath is siinilar to. if not identical
with, the basic

defects in the structure of the ego found in the
neurotic
character.

For Broxnberg the defenses considered to be

used by the psychopathic character
in other neuroses.

-vvere

the same as those

He felt that the presence of anxiety,

guilt, repression, and substitute gratification made it

difficult to view psychopathy as dynamically dissimilar
from symptoir.at ic neurosis.

Karpman (1943a, 1948b) made a significant contribution in elucidating the thinking concerning the presence
of conflict in psychopathy when he divided' the disorder

into two subtypes:
(primary)

symptomatic (secondary) and idiopathic

psychopathy.

In the symptomatic group Karpman

included those cases which, on intensive study, demonstrated
that there was an underlying psychic disturbance responsible
for the appearance of psychopathic behavior.

The neurotic

character discussed by Alexander would be included in this
group.

When all the cases which Karpman was able to place

in his first group were taken care of there still remained
a small group designated as primary psychopaths,

no sign of psychogenesis could be found,

much effort one may make.
1948b.

p.

5

2711"

It

'No

in whom

matter how

just isn't there

[Karpman,

A pervasive difficulty with the concept of psychopathy has been the failure to define the concept in
terms
of a consistent set of criteria.

Least guilty of this

has been Hervey Cleckley (1964), who has compiled a rela-

tively detailed and extensive list of descriptive criteria.
Cleckley'

s

efforts have had great practical value in

helping to clarify what is rceant by psychopathy.
sixteen points
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

[p.

He listed

363]:

Superficial charm and good "intelligence"
Absence of "nervousness" or neurotic
manifestations
Absence of delusions and other signs of
irrational thinking
Unreliability
Untruthfulness and insincerity
Lack of remorse or shame
Inadequately motivated antisocial behavior
Poor judgment and failure to learn by
experience
Pathological egocentricity and incapacity
for love

10. General poverty in major affective reactions
11. Sf^cific loss of insight
12. Unresponsiveness in general interpersonal

relationships
13. Fantastic and uninviting behavior with

drink and sometimes without
14. Suicide rarely carried out
15. Sex life im.personal, trivial and poorly

integrated
16. Failure to follow any life plan

As previous writers had done, Cleckley emphasized the
traditional traits of guiltlessness, incapacity for object
love,

shallowness of emoticr, and impulsivity.

In addition,
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he Introduced some new observations
on the psychopath's

superficial charm by which he often conceals
his asociaiity,
Surprisingly, Cleckley also noted that
psychopaths can be
found not only in prisons but in the respected
positions
of physicians,

Cleckley

scientists, or even psychiatrists.
s

efforts are not without some shortcomings.

Even a cursory look at his list reveals that his
sixteen
criteria are not discrete and independent, there being a
fair degree of overlap and repetition.

It is also not

specified how much relative weight is to be given to the
various criteria.
As phrased, not all of Cleckley'

s

criteria readily

lend themselves to objective validation.

Among the six-

teen listed, the two that have been selected for study
here are "egocentricity and incapacity for love" and

"failure to follow any life plan."

For the latter

criterion, some license has been taken in the present

study in reconceptualizing it as inability to delay gratification.

This is not felt to be a violation of the basic

description when one considers Cleckley'
"He

s

(1964)

statement,

[the psychopath] does not maintain an effort toward

any far goal at all,
(1964)

[p.

statement that,

400]."

"His life

Or McCord

McCords'

[the psychopath's]

is
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dominated by fleeting desires which leave no
space for
farsighted planning

[p.

10]."

Research on Sociopathy
Until Lykken (1955, 1957) presented his work on

anxiety in the sociopathic personality, nothing had been
done experimentally to validate the purported characteristics of the sociopath.

Lykken addressed himself speci-

fically to the sociopath's alleged lack of affective
arousal and recalcitrance to attempts at modification of
his antisocial behavior.

Though Lykken

's

work and most studies "that have

followed it have focused on aspects of behavior
learning and anxiety in the sociopath

— which

— avoidance

are not the

specific interest of the present research, a brief summary
of this work will be given in order that the reader may

be made familiar with the direction and form that research
has taken.

Starting from Cleckley's clinical observations,

Lykken formulated several experimental hypotheses:

a)

sociopaths would be clearly defective compared to normals
in their ability to develop or condition anxiety, defined

as an anticipatory emotional response to warning signals

previously associated with noxious stim.ulation,

b)

paths would exhibit little manifest anxiety in life

socio-
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Situations normally conducive to this response,
and

c)

sociopaths would be relatively incapable of avoidance
learning under those conditions where anxiety would mediate the learning of an avoidance response.

Lykken's task was a 20 choice point irental maze
which the subject was given 20 trials to master (the

manifest task)

At each choice point the subject could

.

choose among any one of four alternative responses, one

correct and three incorrect.

Of the three error alter-

natives, only one would result in the receiving of shock.

The "latent task" was for the subject to avoid receiving
shocks,

i.e.,

alternatives.

to learn to be incorrect on the non-shocked

Presumably, performance on the manifest

task would be reinforced by social and ego rewards and

performance on the latent task, by anxiety reduction.
The measure of anxiety conditionability was taken

independent of the maze learning task, in a classical

conditioning situation using GSR as the dependent variable.

Subjects sat blindfolded listening to two buzzers,

only one of which was paired with shock.

The second

buzzer, of different tone, was used to test for general-

ization effects.

Lykken used three groups in his experiir.ent

:

primary
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sociopaths, neurotic sociopaths, and normals.

The dis-

tinction betwean the primary and neurotic sociopath was
made on the basis of the presence of conflict and manifest
anxiety,

primary sociopathy being indicated by low levels

of anxiety on the Taylor, Lykken, and Welsh anxiety in-

dices.

The distinction that Lykken made was consistent

with Karpraan's primary and secondary psychopath.
Lykken'

s

major hypotheses

'vvere

confirm.ed:

a)

there

was no difference between the groups in learning the manifest task,

b)

the primary sociopaths showed significantly

less avoidance learning on the latent task than normals,

with the neurotics falling about midway between these two
groups, and

c)

the primary sociopaths showed significantly

less GSR reactivity and conditioning than the normals, with

the neurotic sociopaths giving GSR data almost identical to

those of the primary sociopaths.

Results for the basal skin conductance (BSC) measures
among the three groups were equivocal.

The data for the

normals suggested lower BSC than for the sociopaths, but

Lykken postulated that this

m.ay

have been an artifact of

the condition that his sociopaths and controls were run

through the experimental procedure at different seasons
of the year.

Purportedly, skin conductance is affected
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by seasonal changes.
Lykken's study indicated that the sociopath does
not
have a general learning deficit, but, more
specifically,
a deficit in a particular form of anxiety mediated
avoid-

ance learning.

Support for the notion that the sociopath

is not impaired in his general learning ability comes
from

the research of Bernard & Eisennan (1967) and Persons &

Bruning (1966).

In fact, both these studies found learn-

ing in the sociopath to be equal to, if not better than,

learning in normals.

Persons & Bruning (1966) instructed

male incarcerated sociopaths, incarcerated non-sociopaths
and normals to draw three-inch lines.

Knowledge of

results was given verbally by the statements "too long"
and "too short," and by a mild shock for incorrect answers.

The investigators found that the sociopaths demonstrated
the most rapid acquisition and greatest resistance to

extinction.

Bernard & Eisenman (1967), using female

sociopaths and student nurses, employed a verbal condi-

tioning task in which pronouns were reinforced in a sen-

tence-construction task.
were used,
reward.

Two types of positive reinforcers

"good" as social reward and nickels as monetary

The investigators found that the sociopaths

showed significantly

ir.ore

frequent er?.ission of the

reinforced pronoun and that social reward was

it^ore

effec-

tive than monetary reward for both groups.

Partial support for Lykken's finding of lowered

autonomic reactivity in the sociopath can also be found.
Hare

(1965)

monitored skin conductance of psychopathic

and non-psychopathic criminals and non-criminal controls

while they watched the numbers one through twelve con-

secutively presented on a memory drum.

Subjects were pre-

viously told that the number eight would be accompanied

by a shock.

The results showed that as shock approached,

anticipatory arousal, as measured by the increases in log
conductance in the interval prior to shock, began later
and were smaller for the psychopathic than for the non-

psychopathic subjects.

No significant differences,

however, were found between psychopaths and controls for

responsiveness to shock or recovery from the effects of
the shock.

Fox and Lippert (1963) used juvenile offenders diagnosed personality pattern disturbance.

They monitored

spontaneous GSR activity and basal skin conductance while
their subjects were instructed to relax on a couch in a

low ambient noise level room.

The researchers found that

the personality disturbance group exhibited the greatest
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frequency of spontaneous activity,
but no significant
difference between groups was
found in basal skin conductance.

A position directly opposed to
Lykken's and Cleckley's
is that of Schacter and
Latane

sociopath is

inore

(1964)

who argue that the

autonomically responsive than the
normal,

and that their apparently low
manifest anxiety is a func-

tion of a labeling, or cognitive,
factor.
are based,

in part,

upon research

Their arguments

(Schacter & Singer,

1962)

Which demonstrated that a state of
chemically induced

physiological arousal was experienced differently
depending
upon the experim.ental conditions.

Those subjects who were

told what to expect, i.e., the physiological
effects of

epinephrine, the drug used, did not report anger
or

euphoria as did the non-informed subjects.

Schacter and

Latane interpret this experiment to mean that both physiological and cognitive components are required for exper-

iencing an emotion.
In a further experiment intended to clarify the re-

lationship between epinephrine, sociopathy, and avoidance
learning, Schacter and Latane

(1964)

original study but with one addition.
tested

tv;o tinges,

repeated Lykken's
Each subject was

once with an injection of placebo and
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once with epinephrine.

As expected, under the placebo

condition Lykken's original findings

vvere

replicated.

Unexpectedly, hovrever, under the epinephrine
condition
the sociopaths'

perforir^ance on the avoidance task sur-

passed the performance of the normals.

To help explain

this finding, Schacter and Latane appealed to
a com-

panion study in which pre- and post-injection pulse
rates
were taken for sociopaths and normals.

In that study,

pre-injection pulse rates were found to be somewhat
higher for sociopaths, and after injection, the differences favoring the sociopath were even greater.
and Latane

's

Schacter

use of pulse rate rather than GSR intro-

duced the controversial issue of what measure, or measures, of autonomic functioning are best representative
of arousal.

Without attempting to answer this question,

they took their findings of greater pulse rate and
epinephrine sensitivity in the Lykken situation tc support
the thesis that the sociopath is more, not less, auton-

omically responsive than the normal.

They further spec-

ulated that the sociopath's reactivity is indiscriminately
high, almost any event eliciting strong autonomic responses.

In terms of internal cures,

it follows that socio-

paths will feel little differences during times of danger
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or during n^ore tranquil tiines.

it is only under highly

unusual circumstances of stimulation
that the sociopath
is able to feel,

i.e.,

to discriminate or label his emo-

tional state.

Because those conditions which, for others,
would be
associated with emotionality are, for the sociopath
his
normal state, the sociopath might be expected
to be

reckless and to seek out situations that would allow
him
to experience emotion.

Observations of the sociopath's

thrill seeking and reckless behavior would seem to
support this.

The same behavior, however, can also be

seen as the pathological seeking of stimulation arising

from the sociopath's lowered reactivity.
Quay (1965)

interprets much of the psychopath's

antisocial behavior as pathological seeking of stimulation.

He has argued that while the evidence for lowered

basal activity is equivocal, the GSR studies almost uniformly indicate a more rapid adaptation process.

Because

of their lowered basal activity or rapid adaptation,

according to Quay, psychopaths are often in a situation
of stimulus deprivation and are thereby motivated by this

unpleasant condition to change their affective state.
An illuiTiinat ing study, clarifying and providing

fresh insights into the relationship
of anxiety and avoidance learning in sociopaths, has been
reported by Schmauk
(1967,

1970).

Schrnauk's research is primarily a
repli-

cation of Lykken's, with several modifications
and
additions.

The major important modifications were
the

monitoring of GSR activity during the learning of
the
mental maze; the inclusion of three different
types of
punishment:

shock,

(the word wrong)

;

loss of money,

and social punishirent

the operational definition of autonmic

anticipation and autonomic reactivity; and the assessment of the subjective experience of anxiety.
Schrnauk's findings agreed with Lykken's for the

learning of the manifest task but not for the learning of
the latent task.

Schmauk found that under the tangible

punishment condition (loss of money)

,

primary sociopaths

learned to avoid as well as normals, but under the other

two punishment conditions, normals' performance in
learning to avoid

v;as

superior to that of the sociopaths'

.

Schmauk found no significant difference between his groups
in basal skin conductance or in autonomic reactivity.

An

important finding was a groups by punishment interaction
for the autonomic anticipation score

(skin conductance

changes in the five-second interval during which the
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subject chose a lever)

.

Under the tangible punishrDent

condition, autonomic anticipation was about
equal for the

two groups, but under the other two punishment
conditions
the normals had greater anticipation scores,

in addition

primary sociopaths reported greater subjective anxiety
under the tangible punishm.ent condition.
On the basis of Schmauk's (1967, 1970) findings, it
would appear that the popular notion that sociopaths are

deficient in avoidance learning should be qualified to
state that they are deficient in their responsiveness to

particular kinds of punishments.

Find the appropriate

stimuli, and their autonomic responsivity

,

their sub-

jective experience of anxiety, and their ability to learn
to avoid are equal to that of normals.

Based on the findings of Schmauk and others (Lykken,
1957; Schacter & Latane,

1964),

the putatively low

autonomic reactivity of sociopaths has not been clearly
substantiated.

The only reliable finding cutting across

a large number of studies

Schacter & Latane,

(Hare,

1964; Schmauk,

1965; Lykken,
1970)

1957;

is that socio-

paths condition fear m.ore poorly than do normals, and

that their autonomic anticipation of aversive stimuli is

generally less.
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A recent study which also employed GSR
in sociopaths
as one of its primary dependent
measures is of special

interest, not so much for any light it
sheds on the question of autonomic reactivity in sociopaths,
but for its

directing of investigative attention to the study
of the
interpersonal egocentricity and insensit ivity of sociopaths,
one of the major criteria of concern to this study.
(1970)

Sutker

used a vicarious conditioning paradigm to test her

hypothesis that sociopaths have little sensitivity to the
feelings of others.

Basic to her procedure was the recog-

nized phenomenon that emotional responses of one individual

may elicit similar or dissimilar responses in another individual.

Sutker cited evidence that one person observing

another person receiving shocks can

com-e

ditioned GSR to the impending shock.

to evince a con-

Given this research

finding, Sutker theorized that sociopaths, with their re-

duced sensitivity to others, should exhibit less condi-

tionability than normal subjects of a vicarious autonomic
emotional response while observing shock delivered to
another individual
perimenter)

.

(in this

instance a stooge of the ex-

Sutker also hypothesized, as a second mea-

sure of the sociopaths'

insensitivity

,

that sociopaths

would relinquish fewer quarters, given to them prior to
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the experi,.ent, when the
relinquishment of quarters would
serve to prevent the other from
receiving shocks. No

other renumeration was involved
beyond the packet of
quarters.

Subjects for Sutker's study were
all males, twelve

psychology students and twelve volunteer
sociopaths whose
names had been obtained from several
mental health agencies.

After being wired to monitoring equipment,
subjects

were told to sit quietly and listen to
the presentation of
the numbers one through seven.

They were told that after

the number four the other subject would
receive a shock.

There were two pre-conditioning trials and six
conditioning trials.

After the first six conditioning trials, six

more trials followed, with the subject given the
option of

placing one of his six quarters in a box after the num.ber
two was called, in order to prevent the other subject from

receiving shock.
Sutker found no differences between sociopaths and

non-sociopaths in BSC, which is in line with previous
literature

(Fox and Lippert,

1963; Schmauk,

197C)

.

Con-

trary to prediction, Sutker found that sociopaths responded
v;ith

significantly greater GSR conductance changes to all

stim.uli across trials.

They did not, hov-ever, show any
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significant difference in response to the
nuinber three
betv;een pre-conditioning and conditioning
trials, while

the noriT^als did,

confirming previous research findings of

poorer anticipatory responding in sociopaths.

On Sutker's

other measure of insensitivity, the relinquishing
of
quarters, no significant differences were found
between

groups.

While Sutker's findings did not support the thesis
of greater egocentricity of sociopaths,

it cannot hastily

concluded that there are no differences in egocentricity

between sociopaths and normals.

This is because the

scientific method, which provides the procedural foundation of all research, recognizes the limitations and

fallibility of experimentation.

Any experiment is sus-

ceptible to many errors which include errors in design
and procedure as v;ell as interpretation of the data.

One

safeguard against the incorporation of inaccurate conclusions into the body of scientific information is the

expectation that experimental findings be replicated by
other researchers.

When this has not occurred, the value

of the findings of any one study is considered tentative
at best.

Sutker's study, being the first to examine the

hypothesis of the egocentricity or insensitivity of
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sociopaths, should be evaluated with great
care.

In

addition, that Sutker's findings did not
support her

hypothesis of greater insensitivity of sociopaths,
raises
the question of the potency of her dependent
measures.
It is conceivable that another method of measuring
the

egocentricity of sociopaths would give totally different
results from those of Sutker.

The present study, inves-

tigating egocentricity in sociopathy within an experimental context wholely dissimilar to that employed by
Sutker, provided a valuable next step in the evaluation
of egocentricity as one of the criteria of sociopathy.

Further, because of the present investigator's agreement

with Zigler & Phillips (1961) position on the need for
more intensive research into the descriptive dimensions
of behavior disorders, two additional criteria of socio-

pathy were investigated.

Overview and Hypotheses
The three dimensions of sociopathy under consideration
in this study were egocentrism, the inability to delay

gratification, and high risk taking behavior.

The first

two characteristics were drawn from the detailed descriptions of the sociopath given by Cleckley (1964) and by

KcCord & McCord (1964)

.

The third characteristic was

.

extrapolated principally

froin

media based impressions of

the sociopath's life style, which suggested
that sociopaths,

in spite of high risks of failure,

are attracted

to high payoffs that require a minimum expenditure
of

effort.

This last characteristic of risk taking was pro-

posed with less confidence in its validity than the other

two criteria but with the hope that its inclusion would
provide additional insights into the sociopath's behavior.

Egocentrism

.

Based on the literature reviewed above,

an egocentric person was understood to be an individual

who is concerned chiefly with his own desires to the exclusion of those of others.

He is completely absorbed in

himself, craving only his own pleasure.

His attachments

to others are usually fleeting and superficial, and when
he does relate to others,

it is as though they

\^rere

ob-

jects to be used and manipulated to further his own ends.

Cooperation, compromise, or the sacrificing of his needs
for the betterment of others are considered difficult,

if

not alien, concepts for the egocentric individual to

understand

Considering the above description, a task which would
allow for cooperative or exploitative behavior was needed
as an experimental paradigm for egocentricity

,

A task
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that seemed well suited to this requirement
was the

Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game (Crurabaugh & Evans,
1967;
Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh & Lipetz,

1959).

Briefly, this

game is structured so that two players occupying
separate

cubicles are called upon to make a series of choices.
The combined choices made affect the amount of money

earned.

The payoff contingencies and choices are estab-

lished in such a way that each subject has the option of

maximizing his own gain to the disadvantage of the partner
or maximizing mutual gain.

Hypothesis

1

was that sociopaths would' exhibit more

egocentricity (exploitative or uncooperative behavior)
than normals.

Inability to Delay Gratification

.

Not being able to

delay gratification was defined in this study, as per

Mischel (1961)

,

as the preference of immediate smaller re-

inforcements over long term, larger ones.

The sociopath

reputedly is motivated by whim and the immediacy of his
needs.

Long term planning and time consuming considera-

tions are supposedly ignored or given minim.al thought.
If this is so,
over,

it was expected that after the PD game was

the sociopaths, more frequently than the normals,

would choose to take their earnings at the end of the

experiment rather than wait a week for the
additional incentive of one extra dollar.

Hypothesis

2

was that sociopaths, as compared with

normals, would exhibit an inability to delay
gratification,
as measured by a greater number of the
sociopaths indica-

ting a preference for receiving their earnings immediately
after the end of the experiment.

High Risk Taking Behavior

.

By the nature of his

antisocial behavior, the sociopath often gives the impression that he is taking great risks in the face of a
high likelihood of being caught.

Is the sociopath

attracted by high payoffs that require minimum effort
(e.g.,

horse betting) so much so that he ignores or min-

imizes the risks involved?

The method for measuring this characteristic came
at the end of the experiment when the sociopath earned a

fixed amount from the PD game.

He was offered the chance

to multiply his earnings by spinning a dial.
a "five" his earnings were multiplied,

lost all his money.

If he got

if he did not,

he

The multiples were selected so that

chance was clearly against the sociopath's success.

Hypothesis

3

was that sociopaths, as compared with

normals, would exhibit greater risk taking behavior,

i.e..
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sociopaths would go for the "quick
killing"

(an opportun-

ity to i^ultiply their earnings)
more often than normals.

A corollary to this hypothesis was
that sociopaths
would perceive the risk involved in
spinning the dial as
more favorable than would normals, and
this would be re-

flected in their subjective ratings of the
degree of
risk.

CHAPTER

II

METHOD
Subject Selection

Three groups of 35 subjects each participated
in
this research:
paths

(NSs)

,

primary sociopaths (PSs)

and normal controls

(Cs)

.

,

neurotic socio-

Primary and

neurotic sociopaths, all of whom were recidivists,
were
recruited from a population of criminal offenders incarcerated at a large New Jersey reformatory.
the reformatory were all males,

ranging in age from 17 to 35.

Inmates at

predominantly Negro, and
Normal controls were re-

cruited from three Philadelphia high schools varying in
the proportion of racial groups present and in the socio-

economic background of their students.

One school was

atypical in that it provided a post high school technical

training program for its students.

An attempt was made

to match Ss for age, race, IQ, SES, and funds available.

Funds available was determ.ined by asking Ss how much

money they had on

a

weekly basis from any source.

For

those high school students who held jobs, the amount of

money given to their families was subtracted from their
earnings.

Funds available was included among tne matching

.
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variables as a inethod of equating subject
groups for their
subjective estimate of the value of the money
incentives
that were being played for in the prisoner's
dilemma game.

All groups were constituted to be approximately
70% Negro,
average in intelligence, and from lower class
backgrounds.

Socioeconomic status was determined from a rating procedure which incorporates education, occupational prestige, and income into one measure

(Reiss,

1961)

All potential Ss were given, in a group situation,
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)
and the Revised Beta Examination Intelligence Test.

This

was done routinely for the criminal offenders by prison
authorities.

Sociopaths' were considered eligible for

selection if testing had been done within a year's time.
In a large number of instances retesting was done to ob-

tain a more currently accurate record.
a Beta IQ below 85 was not used,

Any

S

receiving

this being considered a

minimum required intelligence level to insure the S's
comprehension of the experimental procedure and instructions.

On the basis of the MMPI score profiles, subjects

were assigned to one of the three groups.
The MMPI was chosen as the main selection device
for

tv;o

reasons.

One,

it

is convenient,

being easily
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administered, scored, and interpreted;
and, two, there is
a large body of literature which
supports its validity in

identifying sociopaths (Craddick, 1962;
Dahlstrom & Welsh,
I960; Gilberstadt & Duker,

1965; Guthrie,

1964; Hathaway & Monachesi,

Meehl,

1946; Stefanowicz,

1950: Hanum,

1953; Marks & Seeraan,

1963;

1967).

In the present research, two groups of
sociopaths

were identified.

The concept of there being two groups

of sociopaths and the procedure used to identify
these

groups followed from the work of several researchers.

Conceptually, the definition of sociopathy was refined
and given greater precision by Karpman

(194Sa,

1948b)

when he forwarded the idea that sociopathy could be mean-

ingfully divided into two subclasses, primary and secondary,
with the separation being made on the basis of the absence
or presence of the neurotic indicants of guilt and

anxiety, respectively.

Lykken (1955) adopted Karpman 's

thinking and translated it into experimental operations.
He identified primary sociopaths and neurotic sociopaths

among a prison population by using Cleckley's criteria in

check list form.
pathic personality

Only inmates with a diagnosis of socioivere

considered by Lykken 's panel of

psychologists for assignment to the primary sociopath or

.
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neurotic sociopath groups.

Lykken also adn,inistered the

MMPI and obtained several measures of
anxiety, including
the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale

(mas)

Consistent with

.

prediction, Lykken found that his PS subjects v^re
signi-

ficantly

lov^er on

the MAS.

The MMPI profiles of the two

groups were similar, both showing elevations on tne
psycnopathic deviate (Pd) and hypomania (Ma) scales, but with
the neurotic sociopaths' mean profile suggesting a ten-

dency to score lower on hypomania

(Ma)

and higher on

depression than the primary sociopaths.
work, Schmauk (1967)

's

selected his primary sociopath sub-

jects to have a Pd-Ma profile on the
pression,

Guided by Lykken

MJ^iPI,

with low de-

psychasthenia, and hypochondriasis scores; and

his neurotic sociopath subjects to have a Pd-Ma profile

with depression, psychasthenia, and hypochondriasis being

higher
In the present research, Schmauk 's procedure for

selecting sociopathic groups (with minor variations) was
used.

A large group of incarcerated Ss received the Beta

and MMPI.

The complete MMPI profile, including the ten

clinical scales, the three validity scales, and the Taylor

MAS (1953), was plotted for each
looking profiles

(Pd and

S^.

Offenders with normal-

Ma below T-score

65,

all other
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scales below T-score 70) or psychotic-appearing
profiles
(paranoia or schizophrenia above T-score
70) were dropped

from further consideration.

Subjects having a Pd-Ma

profile with low MMPI anxiety Scales (hypochondriasis,

hysteria, depression, and psychasthenia) were classified
as primary sociopaths.

Those subjects showing a Pd-Ma

profile with high MMPI anxiety scores were classified

neurotic sociopaths.

In order to objectify this pro-

cedure, a degree of sociopathy score was devised.

This

score was simply the sum of the anxiety scale scores (see
above)

.

Dividing the sociopaths into primary and neurotic

groupings was then accomplished by using a median split on
the Total Anxiety (TA)

scores, the upper half

(those with

the greatest Total Anxiety scores) being assigned to the

neurotic sociopath group.
(Schmauk,

1967)

Then, based on previous research

which showed that neurotic sociopaths ex-

hibit higher MAS scores than primary sociopaths, any S
with an MAS score that deviated greatly from the average
of his preliminary group designation was excluded from

the study.

Finally, after the initial division of the criminal

offenders into PS and NS groups, further purification of
the groups was made by considering an additional criterion.
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Each S's case history was read looking
for signs of
tionality.

eino-

it was intended that the PS subjects
should

not have signs or indications of strong
emotions attri-

buted to them in their histories.

For example, a can-

didate for the PS group should not have had
a notation in
his history that during an interview he was "crying"
or

"extremely anxious."

Obversely, a candidate for the NS

group should not have had terms like "unfaeling,"
"guiltless," or "cold" attributed to him.

In practice

the charts were not especially useful in eliminating Ss.

This was because there was too much variability in the
contents of different charts and because many different
prison guards were responsible for the rating of inmates.

Only one £ was eliminated on the basis of chart material,
there being a large number of

comjr.ents

suggesting psychosis

Procedure

Because strategy choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma
(PD)

game have been shown to be related to personality

traits and attitudes (Deutsch, 1960; Lutzker, 1960;

McClintock, Harrison, Strand & Gallo, 1963; Terhune, 1968),
and because the game provides an opportunity for the ex-

pression of both cooperative and exploitative behavior,
it v/as selected as the experimental paradigm for assessing

.
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egocentricity.

Prisoner's

Dilgn^;._a.

Typically, the PD situation is

structured so that each player has the
option of inaximizing his own earnings or iPaximizing
i^utual earnings.

To

clarify, the contingencies for the
payoff matrix illus-

trated

(See Figure

1)

would be as follows:

If both

players X and Y chose red this would be
a cooperative
choice maximizing the gain of both parties

parties receive

$

.10).

if,

(i.e.,

both

however, either X or Y chose

red and the other person chose blue, the
person choosing

blue has maximized his gain (he gets

disadvantage

(he

gets

$

.05).

$

.15)

to the other's

Both players choosing blue

would result in mutual loss (i.e., both players would
receive

$

.03)

In this experiment, the basic procedure was modified

to make the situation more sensitive to exploitative or

egocentric behavior.

A real player Y was eliminated, and

instead the subject played against a predetermined series
of responses made by the experimenter.

were red or cooperative.

All of Y's choices

The onus, then, of cooperating,

or taking advantage of the partner, was on the subject.

Because all Ss were playing against a
strategy,

lOQP/o

cooperative

it was feared that word of mouth v^ould communicate

i
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this and arouse the suspicions of future
Ss.

To

tnininiize

this problem, the first two Ss and every
sixth S after
that were buffer 3s.

Included only for the purpose of

deception, these Ss played the PD against
a matching of
previous choice strategy, and were allowed to earn
denominations of money different from actual S s

.

Also,

in

modifying the procedure, an attempt was made to avoid
communicating to the subjects that the Prisoner's

Dilemma was in any way a "game."

It was felt that if the

subjects believed the situation to be a game they would
be "set" to "win" and would choose competitive responses.

To clarify the experimental requirements and the payoff
contingencies, the usual matrix presentation format was

modified to include written statements of the contingencies

(See Figure

1)

.

The payoff contingencies were ad-

justed so that a competitive response was especially dan-

gerous (known as the "chicken" variant of the PD) resulting
in the lowest possible outcome under the condition of

mutual competitive choices.

It was speculated that this

would encourage cooperation and thereby ennance the sen-

sitivity of the PD to the exploitative tendencies of the
sociopaths.

In addition,

the procedure,

to facilitate comprehension of

a color code was included on the charts
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above the respective payoffs indicating
the color choices
that would give that payoff.

The experimental procedure can be
conceptualized as

being divided into four stages, three
corresponding to the
three hypotheses under question, and the
last to the ad-

ministration of a post-experimental questionnaire.

The

instructions for the experimental procedure are
presented
in Appendix A.

Egocentricitv.

During the first, and longest, part

of the experiment the Ss participated in the ?D game.

Each S sat in a cubicle set off by two Masonite partitions
at right angles to each other.

Each

S

participated in the

procedure alone but was led to believe that there was

another person facing him on the other side of the partition.

The experimenter

(E)

was situated at a right angle

to both subject cubicles and was separated from S by one

wall of the partition.
passed to the

S

When necessary, materials were

through a slot in the partition.

The

apparatus was placed on a table top and oak tag sheets
were used to screen the

Posted in front of the

Figure

1

S^'s

3

view from under the table.

was the payoff matrix shown in

(minus the X and Y entries)

,

indicating the

possible choices he could make and the respective payoffs

46
in cents.

Although each

the other,

in reality he played against the E
and received

S

thought he was playing against

constant feedback that his "partner" was making
only coop-

erative choices, i.e., was always picking red.

When a

light flashed in front of him, the S selected
a blue or

red card and passed it to the E through the slot
in the

partition.

The E in turn recorded S's selection and the

amount of money earned.

The E returned the choice card

along with a payoff card which made it clear to the

S

what the respective choices were and what the payoff con-

tingencies were, e.g., "you chose blue, he chose red? you
get

15j2f,

he gets

Sjzf."

On every fifth trial, the

S

received

a card indicating how much money he had earned up to that

point.

Each

played the game until he came as close to a

$3.00 limit as was possible given the varying "win" units
of ten and fifteen cents.
or more than $3.10.

No

received less than $3.00

The number of trials any

S

took to

reach this limit depended on the proportion of cooperative
or exploitative choices that he made.

The greatest possi-

ble number of trials was 30, and the least, 20.

Because

inmates were not allowed to have money in their possession,

other arrangements were made so that they could convert
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their earnings into canteen merchandise,
or, if they preferred, have the money credited to their
account.

If they

chose to convert to canteen goods, they
^^re given a

canteen slip redeemable at the canteen itself,

m

order

to equate, as much as possible, the delay in
payrrent for
the controls and sociopaths, the controls were
given

vouchers which they gave to a designated high school

official in return for cash.

After the Prisoner's Dilemma game was played up to
the $3.00 limit and the S's preference for immediate or

delayed gratification was determined (see below), a new

matrix was introduced with increased payoff values
(Figure

matrix.

1)

.

Subjects were given only one trial on this

The purpose of its inclusion was to increase

the attractiveness of an exploitative strategy.

By doing

this it was hoped that sociopaths who might have been

making cooperative choices to impress the examiner would
be attracted enough by the higher payoff to change their

strategy to a more exploitative one.

Delay of Payoff

.

At the end of the PD game, each S

was asked to indicate on a slip of paper whether he would

prefer the money he had earned that day immediately after
the experim.ent was over; or whether he v;ould prefer to

,
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wait a week, at which ti.e
a dollar bonus would be
added,

bringing his earnings to
approximately four dollars.

Risk Tak ing.

For the third phase of the
experirr.ent

the S was taken to another
room.

The E explained to the

S that he now had the
opportunity to increase his earnings

He could do this if he cnose by
spinning a dial on a board

where the numbers one through five
were written,
got a five,

the E would pay him fifteen dollars,

if he

if he

did not get a five, he would lose
all that he had earned
(with the exception of the dollar bonus
for those Ss who

chose to delay)

.

The S was told what the odds against

him were.

Post-experiment Questionnaires

After the

.

S had

made his risk choice, the E asked him to rate his
partner
on several variables

(see Appendix B)

,

and to fill out

answers to a questionnaire in nis own words (see Appendix
C)

.

In administering the rating scale, the questions

alternately reversed scale direction to help prevent in-

discriminate marking.

The amount of income from any

source that the S received in a v«ek was also determined
at this time.

CHAPTER

III

RESULTS
The sociopaths and
in total,

norir.al

on 33 variables.

controls

Tvere

compared,

The basic statistical treat-

ments were the chi-square for independence,
and the onefactor analysis of variance

sequential range test

(with the Newinan-Keuls

eir.ployed,

comparisons between means)

.

when appropriate, for

The F max test was initially

applied to the data to ascertain the presence of homo-

geneity of variance.

In several instances, F max re-

vealed violations of the homogeneity assumption.

Because

the violations were minor and the analysis of variance is
a robust procedure

(Lindquist,

was not contraindicated.

1953? Myers,

1966)

its use

Discussions of those instances

of heterogeneity of variance are offered, where relevant,
in the presentation of results.
In the statistical analysis of the data, a confidence

level of

_£

=

.05 was adopted.

At this value or below, the

null hypothesis was not accepted.

For the sake of

thoroughness, ho^vever, significance levels from £ <.01 to

2

<.10 are reported.

Directional tests of significance

were em.ployed where indicated.
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Group M atching and Selection Variables
An attempt was
SES,

IQ,

to match the three groups for age,

ir,ade

funds available, and race.

The means and stan-

dard deviations for these variables, with the
exception of
race, which was treated separately,

are presented in Table

1.

The F ratios for each variable are reported in
Appendix

D.

Inspection of Table

reveals that the subject groups

1

were significantly different on the m.easures age and funds

available.

For both indices, both groups of sociopaths

differed from the controls but not from each other.

Be-

cause groups were not matched on these two variables,

either Pearson product moment correlations or point biserial correlations were calculated between these measures
and the major dependent measures, to determine if group

differences on these variables were effected by differences
in the matching variables.

The correlations obtained for

the relationships between age and percent exploitative

response,

irraiaediate

and delayed gratification,

and low risk were .14,

.04,

and

.13,

and high

respectively.

The

correlations between funds available and the dependent

measures were -.15,

.02,

tions were significant,

and
(df =

.15.

103),

None of the correla-

permitting the assump-

tion that any group differences present on the major

51

TABLE

1

Comparisons of Means and Standard Deviations for Th
Subject Groups on Matching Variables with
Significa
Levels Obtained from the Newman-Keuls Sequential
Range Test

Groups

Age

IQ

SES

Funds

Descriptive Data

Mean

3.D.

c

17.9

PS

NS

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

3 .D.

.9

104.5 12.3

25.9

on o

9.69

5

21.4

2.0

103.5 10.2

25.5

16.8

6.75

4 .25

20.7

1.7

101.3

24.3

16.8

7.03

4 .25

9.5

Newman-Keuls Comparisons

(p

41

values)

C-PS

.01

n

n

.05

C-NS

.01

n

n

.05

NS-PS

.10

n

n

n

—

.

Note. All significance levels are less than the p
d >.1C is indicated by the letter n.
values indicated.

dependent variables were not contributed to by
group

differences in age and funds available.
For the age variable, a significant value of F
max
was obtained

(F

max

=

4.95,

£

<.01)

.

The occurrence here

of heterogeneity of variance appears to be the
consequence
of the limited range of Ss available from the upper
grades

of the high school population.

The data for race v«re analyzed by chi-square.

The

number of Black subjects for the C, PS. and NS groups were
24,

25,

and 24, respectively.

The value of

obtained was

not significant, denoting that all groups were equally

matched on this variable
In Table

2

(x^

=

.03,

df^ =

2)

.

the means and standard deviations for the

MMPI-based group selection measures are presented along
with the significance levels for the Newman-Keuls comparisons of group means.

The F ratios for these variables in

addition to the other MMPI measures are found in Appendix
D.

For the Total Anxiety and MAS measures, computation of

F max indicated minor violations of the homogeneity of

variance assumption.

The values obtained were 3.47 and

3.92 respectively (£ <.01).

These minor violations of

homogeneity of variance are the result of experim^ental
manipulations, in that all control Ss were included in
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TABLE

2

Comparisons of Means and Standard Deviations for
Principal
MMPI Group Assignment Measures with Significance
Levels Obtained from the Newman-Keuls Sequential
Range Test

Groups

Pd

Ma

Ta

MAS

Descriptive Data

Mean

S.D.

C

19.9

PS

NS

Mean S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

3.0

20.7

3.3

210.0 22.1

12.0

5.6

28.6

2.1

24.8

2.5

211.4 11.9

7.8

2.3

29.7

3.2

24.6

2.7

249.1 15.3

18.0

4.6

Newman-Keuls Comparisons

(£ values)

C-PS

.01

.01

n

.01

C-NS

.01

.01

.01

.01

NS-PS

n

n

.01

.01

—

Note. All significance levels are less than the p
values indicated, _£ >.10 is indicated by the letter n.
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the study regardless of their Total
Anxiety and MAS scores,

while sociopaths, on the other hand,
were excluded or included in the experiment based on the
values of Total

Anxiety and KAS

.

Consequently, their scores exhibited

less variance than did those for the
control subjects.

The statistical analyses reported in Table

Table 23

(see Appendix D)

2

and

provide a gross quantitative

measure of the success of the selection procedures.

The

Newman-Keuls analyses indicate that the PSs and NSs did
not differ on Pd and Ma of the MI4PI, but were,

in accord

with selection objectives, significantly different
on Total Anxiety and MAS,

both measures.

<.01)

the PSs having lower scores on

Control Ss were significantly different

from the sociopaths on Pd and Ma as well as

I4AS

.

On the

latter measure, their scores fell midway between the PSs
and NSs.

Neurotic sociopaths and controls were signifi-

cantly different on Total Anxiety but PSs and controls
were not.

Figure

2

three groups.

presents the graphed MMPI profiles for the

Table

T-scores for all

13

3

presents a comparison of the MMPI

scales with significance levels

between group means obtained from the Newman-Keuls
sequential range test.
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O

C Group
?S Group

N3 Group

Figure

2.

Graphs of

lillPI

T-scores
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TABLE

3

Coraparisons of Subject Groups' MMPI T-3cores with
Significance Levels of Multiple Comparisons
Obtained frorr. the Newroan-Keuls
Sequential Range Test

MMPI Scales

L

F

K

Hs

D

Hv

Pd

Mf

Pa

Pt

Sc

Ma

Si

c

50

58

51

52

56

51

53

59

50

52

55

60

51

PS

53

55

57

52

56

55

74

57

50

52

55

70

45

NS

53

62

49

59

65

60

76

61

56

62

59

70

50

Newman-Keuls Comparisons

(p values)

C-PS

n

n

.01

n

n

.05

.01

n

n

n

n

.01

.01

C-NS

n

.01

n

.01

.01

.01

.01

n

.01

.01

n

.01

n

NS-PS

n

.01

.01

.01

.01

.01

n

n

.01

.01

n

n

.01

—

Note. All significance levels are less than the
values indicated. _£ >.10 is indicated by the letter _n.
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Major D ependent Variablf^a
Prisoner's

dilemrr.a a nd

exploitative behavior

jects participating in the PD played the

gaine

Sub-

.

for an un-

equal number of trials but for approximately
equal amounts
of money.

For this reason,

presented in percent form.

Ss

'

exploitative scores are

The means and standard devia-

tions for the percent exploitative response for each

group are presented in Table

4.

Significance of differ-

ences between the means was tested by an analysis of

variance
found.

(see Table 5)

Hypothesis

1

.

No significant differences were

therefore was not confirmed.

Socio-

paths did not exhibit significantly greater exploitative

behavior than the control subjects.

Results were in the

predicted direction for the PS and C groups, the PSs

scoring higher on exploitativeness

difference of 5.5% was slight.

,

but the mean group

Neurotic sociopaths, in

opposition to prediction, scored slightly lower than the
Cs on exploitativeness.
In examining exploitative behavior in the PD game,

particular attention was focused on
trials one and two.

S^s

'

responses on

Choice behavior on these trials was

considered especially important for several reasons.

Trial one, of all trials, best reflected the S's initial
attitude or posture towards his partner.

Because

a
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TABLE 4

Means and Standard Deviations for
Percent Exploitative
Response in the Prisoner's Dilemma Garre

Group

Mean

Standard Deviation

C

60.9

25.3

PS

66.4

24.3

NS

59.8

31.7

—
59

TABLE

5

Analysis of Variance for
Percent Exploitative Response

Suiranary of

Source of Variation

Between Groups

df

SS

MS

2

881.313

440.656

Within Groups

102

75952.750

744.635

Total

104

76334.063

Note.

o

>.10 indicated by the letter n.

.592

n
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response on this trial preceded feedback from
the partner
and the establishment of a pattern of interaction,
the 3

having been explained the nature of the payoff
contingencies was in the position of having to guess at his
partner's probable strategy.

A trusting

S,

expecting his

partner to pick red, would likely respond in kind and
choose red also.

On the other hand a suspicious

S,

ex-

pecting his partner to choose blue, might be expected to
choose blue himself in order to teach the other person a
lesson and prevent him from obtaining an advantage.

Con-

sistent with the theoretical position that sociopaths are

egocentric, they were expected to be less trustful and more
likely to select blue on the first trial.
Subjects' responses to trial two were also of special

interest since it was the first time the ^s made a strategy
choice with the benefit of feedback on the other's willingness to cooperate.

Over iterated trials the possibility

existed that the "other's" unconditionally cooperative

behavior may have made
of their partner.

S^s

somewhat skeptical of the reality

This possible disbelief in the presence

of the other could have had the effect of diluting group

differences.

Such skepticism, while conceivably present on

later trials,

oould hardly have been present on trial two.

Response on trial one, then, gave
trusting a

was,

som.e

idea of how

and choice on trial two would seem to

.
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reflect on how trustworthy the

S was.

It was anticipated

that sociopaths would be less trusting
and trustworthy.
In Table 6 are reported the percent of
Ss choosing

the exploitative response on trials one and two.

Results

are given in percent form because of the loss of
one S's

data.

The data presented in Table

use of

X

.

A total of six

6

were analyzed by the

were indicated, three for

the groups comparisons on trial one, and three for the

groups comparisons on trial two.
all six

the

Rather than computing

for the largest group difference on

either trial was computed first under the following
rationale.

If this

x

were nonsignificant, then none of

the other x^ could be significant.

If this x^, however,

were significant, then the x^ for the next largest group

difference would be calculated

— and

so on.

As it happened,

the x^ obtained for the NS and C groups on trial two (the

largest of the six differences) was not significant
(X^

= 1.18,

df

£

^.15,

one-tailed test).

"While

group

differences did not reach significance, more sociopaths
than controls chose the exploitative response for both
trials

A further analysis was undertaken to determine

if the

sociopathic and control groups differed in exploitative

TABLE

6

Percent of Subjects Choosing the
Exploitative
Response on Trials One and Two in
the Prisoner's Dilerrana Game

Trial One

Trial Two

C

35

44

PS

46

54

NS

43

57
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behavior over the course of PD play.

Also of interest

was whether exploitativeness varied over trials
for all

groups.

To answer these questions a two factor Groups X

Blocks repeated measures analysis of variance (see
Table

8)

was performed on the mean number of exploitative choices
per block (see Table

7)

.

Generally, before a repeated

measures analysis of variance is performed, heterogeneity
of covariance is determined.

Because this procedure is

laborious, an alternate procedure, outlined by V7iner
(1962)

was employed.

This alternate method assumes hetero-

geneity of covariance and evaluates F ratios on adjusted
degrees of freedom.

Because of the loss of data for one

subject, the analysis was adjusted for unequal N by the

method of least squares.
of trials for individual

Due to the fact that the number
S^s

varied between 20 and 30, the

lower limit of 20 trials, divided into four blocks, was

used for the analysis.

As can be seen

(Table 8),

there

was a significant Blocks main effect which is consistent

with the preponderance of research with the PD, which has
found an increase in com.petitive choices over a short

number of trials (Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967; Lutzker, 1960;
Vinacke,

1969).

There was no significant Group main effect

or Groups X Blocks interaction,

though as can be seen
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TABLE

7

Means and Standard Deviations for Exploitative
Choices for Each of Four Trial Blocks

^^Q^PS

Block One

Block Two

Block Three

Block Four

^gan

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

s.D.

C

2.1

1.41

2.9

1.54

3.3

1.78

3.6

1.80

PS

2.7

1.47

3.2

1.37

3.4

1.48

3.7

1.41

NS

2.5

1.60

2.9

1.73

3.1

1.85

3.3

1.74
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TABLE 8

Summary of Groups X Blocks Analysis of
Variance for Mean Number Exploitative
Choices Per Block

Source of Variation

df

ss

MS

2

7.09

3.54

Subjects Within Groups 101

789.29

7.81

3

66.30

6

4.46

.74

303

253.00

.83

^^°^PS

Groups X Blocks

.453

22.10 26.465
.889

Blocks X Subjects Within

Blocks

—

Note. All significance levels are less than the
£
values indicated, p >.10 is indicated by the letter n.

n

.01
n

.
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clearly from Figure

3,

the PSs

^re

consistently (albeit

nonsignificantly) more exploitative than
either NSs or Cs
over all trial blocks.

Exploitative behavior on the second matrix with
higher
payoff values (introduced for one trial) was not
signifi-

cantly different for the three groups
(x^

£

>.10).

PSs,

=

.544, df = 2,

The number of subjects choosing blue for the Cs,

and NSs were 18,

21,

and

19,

respectively.

These

results were in the predicted direction.
In sum, on the aggregate measures of exploitativeness

obtained from the PD situation, sociopaths were not signi-

ficantly different from controls.
trends in the data.

There were, however,

Both groups of sociopaths combined,

tended, on the average, to choose the exploitative strategy

more frequently than did normals.

Primary sociopaths were

consistently more exploitative than controls.

Sociopaths

tended to be less trusting and trustworthy as reflected in
their behavior on the first two trials of the PD

.

In

addition, when exploitation in the PD was made a more

appealing option, sociopaths once again tended to respond
more competitively.

All these findings were in the pre-

dicted direction, but all differences were small and

nonsignificant

.
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Blocks of five trials

Figure 3.

Changes in exploitative choices over trial
blocks

.
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Irrmedlate vs. delayed gratif icatlnn

.

Before analyzing

the data for delay of gratification,
it was important to

determine that subject groups had not earned
unequal amounts
of money up to the imrrediate vs. delay decision
choice

point.

This concern also applied for monies earned for the

high or low risk decision.

In Table 9 are presented the

means and standard deviations for monies earned up to both
these major decision points.

A

surrtmary of the

of variance is reported in Table 10.

Table

9,

analyses

As can be seen from

approximately $3.00 per group had been earned as

of the immediate vs. delay decision point, and no signifi-

cant differences among groups in money earned were found
at this point.

For the high vs. low risk choice, groups

had earned approximately $3.30.

The additional 300 was the

average sum earned on the one trial of play with the
second payoff matrix.

No group differences were found here

either
The number of delay choices for the Cs, PSs, and NSs
were 13,

19,

and 11,

respectively.

analyzed by a series of three

between groups comparisons.

These differences

;-;ere

the three possible

Because prediction and

existing theory indicated the direction of differences, the
chi-squares for the comparisons of the experimental groups
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TABLE

9

Means and Standard Deviations of Monies Earned
at Each of the Two Major Choice Points

Q^^Q^Ps

First
choice point

(I

vs. D)

Second
choice point

(H vs.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

C

3.03

.04

3.31

.09

PS

3.05

.04

3.34

.09

NS

3.03

.04

3.31

.09

L)

—

.

.
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TABLE 10
Suitmary of Analyses of Variance for Monies
Earned at Each of the Two Major

Choice Points

Source of Variation

df

Immediate vs

Between Groups

SS

MS

F

Delay Choice Point

2

.006

.003

Within Groups

102

.149

.002

Total

104

.

2.025

n

155

High vs. Low Risk Choice Point

Between Groups

2

.016

.008

Within Groups

102

.814

.008

Total

104

.831

Note.

^

1.023

>.10 is indicated by the letter n

n
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with the control group were assessed against
one-tailed
tests.

Because little is known about the relationship

of PSs and NSs,

the chi-square comparing these groups

was tested non-directionally
test.

,

i.e.,

with a two-tailed

The comparison of number of delay choices between

the Cs and NSs yielded a significant

2 <.05).

The

of 2.886

obtained for the difference

and PSs was .06

(df =

1,

£ >.10).

The x^

ences between the NSs and PSs was 3.74 (df

approaching significance.
indicate that hypothesis

(df = 1,

bet^z/een

Cs

for the differ=

1,

p <.06),

The results of these analyses
2

was confirmed only in part.

The Cs demonstrated a significantly greater capacity for

delayed gratification than the NSs, but no differences in

delaying capacity was found for the Cs and PSs.
ingly,

Surpris-

the PSs and NSs were found to be dissimilar in their

preferences for delayed gratification.

The PSs were more

like the Cs and exhibited greater delay capacity than tne
NSs, the difference closely approaching significance.

High vs. low risk
in Table 9,

the high vs.

.

As discussed above and illustrated

no differences existed in money earned up to

low risk decision point.

The number of C, PS, and NS subjects choosing high

risk were

2,

8,

and

2,

respectively.

Before these results

.

for the high vs. low risk variable can be
meaningfully

discussed, however, it is necessary to think about
a pro-

blem of interpretation of these data that was created by
a weakness inherent in the experimental design.

Because

a subject's high or low choice follo^ved his choice of

immediate or delayed gratification, different

_Ss

were

presented with different options at the high vs. low risk

decision making point.

A

who had chosen to delay was

told that if he lost in the risk situation he would lose
all his money except the $1.00 bonus for waiting a week.

A

who had chosen an imonediate response was told that

he would lose all his money.

Clearly, the delay

S^,

who

ended up with some money (no matter how little) would
likely find the high risk option more attractive than

would the immediate

S

(who might end up with no money)

In order to determine if an immediate or delay choice

had an effect on risk taking, a

immediate and delay
low risk choices.
df

"1,

p <.05)

S_s

x'^

'-^^s

calculated between

(summiing over groups)

The value of

indicated that

x" obtained
S-s

for high and
(y^

=

4.64,

making a delay choice

were more likely to opt for the high risk than immediate

choice

S^s.

Though this weakness was inherent in the

design of the experim.ent, no problem in interpretation
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would have occurred had the results
ccnforT^ed to prediction.

It was hypothesized that sociopaths
would prefer

iimiediate gratification and higher
risk.

Had the socio-

paths chosen the inmediate contingency
more often than
normals, this would have biased their decision
against

high risk.

If they then chose high risk more frequently,

even stronger support would have been indicated
for their
high risk propensity.

Interpretation, then, of risk taking behavior cannot
be made without first comparing groups on their delay

decisions.

Because no difference in delay preference was

found for the PSs and Cs, their risk taking behavior can
be compared directly.
(

= 4.20,

df

= 1,

p

A directional
<.025).

test was perform^ed

This confirmed hypothesis

3

for the primary sociopaths, which stated that sociopaths

would exhibit greater risk taking behavior than controls.

A comparison of the delay choices of the Cs and N3s revealed that nearly twice as many C subjects preferred

delayed reward.

This being so, a negative bias was in-

troduced against the neurotic sociopaths choosing the high
risk option

— they

had more to lose than the control

subjects.

That

control subjects and

2

2

neurotic socio-

paths preferred high risks suggests that neurotic

.
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sociopaths may have a greater propensity for
high risk
conditions.
subjects'
below)

This possibility is supported by the data
for

ratings of their perception of risk (see Table 16

which shows that neurotic sociopaths rated the

four to one odds as more favorable than did the controls.

A statistical comparison of tne number of PSs and
NSs who preferred high risk indicated that the PSs ex-

hibited the greater proclivity for risk taking

M

"

1'

£ <.05).

(^2

=

4,20,

After considering the delay behavior of

both these groups, the finding for risk preference still
holds but less strongly.

delay as the NSs.
preference,

Nearly twice as many PSs chose

If the groups were equal in risk taking

it might have been expected that twice as many

PS as NS subjects would have chosen high risk.
ity,

In actual-

four times as many primary sociopaths chose high risk

as did neurotic sociopaths.

In sum,

statistical analysis of the risk choices

allows for the conclusion that significantly more PSs pre-

ferred high risk than Cs.

A post hoc, crude interpreta-

tion of the results suggests that NSs may fall m.idway

between Cs and PSs in their preference for high risk.

Supplementary Dependent Variables
Ratings

Subjects filled out ratings on intelligence

.
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of the other person, cooperation
of the other person,

cooperation of self, and the other's
consistency.

Means

and standard deviations for tnese
ratings are presented
in Table 11.

The values in Table 11 have been
adjusted

so that for each scale

1

represents the low end and

the

7

high end of the scale.

The F ratios for each scale are

presented in Table 12.

None of the F ratios reached

significance, indicating that none of the groups differed

from each other in their overall ratings.

To compare

Ss

'

ratings of their own cooperativeness

and others cooperativeness,

a repeated measures Groups X

Cooperativeness analysis of variance was performed.

The

results of this analysis are summarized in Table 13.

As

can be seen, no main effect for Groups or interaction

effect for Groups X Cooperativeness was found.

There was,

however, a significant main effect for Cooperativeness
(£ <.01)

.

This indicates that all groups accurately

perceived the "other person" as
themselves.

m.ore

cooperative than

Rather than laboriously computing the matrix

of covariances for this analysis, heterogeneity of co-

variance was assumed and the main effect for cooperation
was tested against a critical value based on the adjusted

degrees of freedom of

1

and 34

(Winer,

1962)
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TABLE 11

Standard Deviations for Rating Scores

^^Q^Ps

C

Intelligence Cooperation Cooperation Consistency
of other
of other
of self

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

s.D.

Mean

s.D.

3.9

1.6

5.7

1.6

3.6

2.2

5.6

1.9

1.7

5.4

2.1

4.1

2.3

5.6

2.1

2.1

5.7

1.9

4.2

2.5

5.2

2.3

4.3
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TABLE 12

Summary of Analyses of Variance for Rating Scores

Source of Variation

df

SS

MS

F

Intelligence of Other

Between Groups

2

11.369

5.685

Within Groups

102

333.256

3.267

Total

104

344.626

1.740

n

.255

n

.738

n

Cooperation of Other

Between Groups

2

1.844

.922

Within Groups

102

369.142

3.619

Total

104

370.986

Cooperation of Self

Between Groups

2

8.126

4.063

Within Groups

102

561.713

5.507

Total

104

569.839
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TABLE 12 (contd.)

Consistency

Between Groups

2

4.012

2.006

Within Groups

102

449.942

4.411

Total

104

453.954

Note.—£ >.lo

is indicated by the

.455

letter n.
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TABLE 13

Summary of Groups X Cooperativeness Analysis
of Variance for Rating Scores
'

Source of Variation

df

SS

MS

2

2 .60

1.30

102

484 .26

4.75

1

142 .52

2

7 .38

3.69

Cooperativeness X Subjects 102

446 .60

4.38

Groups

Subjects within Groups

Cooperativeness
Groups X Cooperativeness

F

.

274

142.52 32 .550
.843

within Groups

—

Note.
Significance levels are less than the
indicated values.
d >.10 is indicated by the letter n.

S.

n

.01
n
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Though the control and experiinental groups
were not
found to be different in their rating
scores,

sidered of interest to determine whether

Ss

'

it was con-

rating scores

differed in relation to the degree of exploitative
behavior exhibited in the PD

.

Presented in Table 14 are

the product moment correlations for degree of exploita-

tive response and rating scale scores for each group.

For

the correlations between exploitative response and rating
of others' intelligence,
{2

<.01)

PSs.

significant inverse correlations

were found for the NSs and Cs but not for the

It appears that for the NS and C groups, the more

exploitative Ss tended to devalue the intelligence of
their partner.
The correlations between exploitativeness and cooper-

ation of the other were all nonsignificant, but were all
inverse,

suggesting that there was a tendency for high

exploitative
tive.

S^s

to misperceive their partner as uncoopera-

This effect could have occurred as the result of

some high exploitative Ss' attempts to rationalize their

behavior by projecting uncooperat iveness onto the other.
It is also possible that this finding of an inverse rela-

tionship bet'veen degree of exploitativeness and cooperation of the other person comes from the general devaluing
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of the other person that would likely be associated
with

his willingness to be victimized.

In completing the

rating forms, a negative halo effect may have been operating which reduced the ratings on those scales which

reflected on the worth of the other person.
The correlations for degree of exploitation and self

cooperation were all in the negative direction.
cant correlations

<.01)

{£

but not for the PSs.

Signifi-

were found for the NSs and Cs

For these two groups there was a

trend for high exploitative Ss to rate their cooperativeness in accord with their exploitat iveness

.

The nonsigni-

ficant correlation for the PS group suggests that these
S^s

were less willing or able to accurately label their

exploitative behavior.
As anticipated, no significant correlations were

obtained between degree of exploitation and subjects'

perception of the others' consistency.
In order to determine if the correlations between

degree of exploitative response and rating scores were

significantly different between groups, the correlations
were transformed to

calculated.

z

scores and group differences were

These are presented in Table 15.

As can be

seen from Table 15, none of the group differences reacned
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Significance.

The one group difference
closest to

approaching significance

<.io)

occurred between the Cs

and PSs for the relationship
between degree of exploita-

tion and self cooperativeness
The means and standard deviations
for S s
of risk scores are presented in
Table 16.

•

perception

The perception

of risk rating scale was presented
to Ss as part of the

questionnaire because its content was
that context.

A

5

i.ost

point scale was used.

appropriate in

Analysis of the

rating scores for heterogeneity of
variance obtained an F
niax

value of 4.44 (£ <.01),

indicating a violation of the

homogeneity of variance assumption.

Examination of the

distribution of rating scores suggests that
heterogeneity
of variance occurred as the consequence of the
control 3s'

ratings clustering about the lower end of the rating
scale.

Analysis of variance (see Table
approaching significance

(_£

17)

yielded an F ratio

<.10).

Because the corollary to hypothesis

3

predicted that

sociopaths would consider the risk as more favorable than
would the controls, the rating scores for the control group
were compared directly to the scores for both sociopathic

groups by the use of Dunnett

'

s

t_

test

(Winer,

1962).

mean rating scores for PSs and NSs being the same, a

The

85

TABLE 16

Means and Standard Deviations for
Perception of Risk Taking Scores

^i-HHi^

Mean

Standard Deviation

C

1-.83

.57

PS

2.26

.92

NS

2.26

1.20

TABLE 17
Suininary of

Analysis of Variance for Perception
of Risk Rating Scores

Source of Variation

df

ss

MS

2

4.285

2.143

Within Groups

102

88.343

.866

Total

104

92.628

Between Groups

Note.— The significance value

£

value indicated.

is

2.474

less than th

87

single value of Dunnetf

s

t

was obtained for the compari-

son of both these groups with the controls

df

=

102,

£

<.05). AS predicted,

to normal controls,

(t

=

1.94,

sociopaths, as coir.pared

perceived the same risk contingencies

as less risky.

Questionnaire answers

.

A questionnaire was included

in the study to determine what strategies and motives
Ss

were able to articulate as affecting their decisions in
the various phases of the experiment.

Subjects* answers

to each question were inspected and the motives that seemed
to be operating were identified.

Subjects' responses were

then placed in the motive category that was most appropriate

The results for the questionnaire are sketchy at best.

This is because a large number of Ss, in several instances nearly fifty percent, gave ansv;ers which were ex-

tremely idiosyncratic or incomprehensible.

Such a large

percentage of uncategorized responses dim.inishes the confidence that can be placed in the ganeralizability of
these results.

For this reason no attempt at a rigorous

statistical analysis was made.
The first question put to ^s was,

"vVhat '^ere

you

trying to do in the decision making situation with the
other person?"

In Table 18 the percent of

S^s

falling into

88
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the motive categories:

econoinic,

and unclassified are presented.

competitive, cooperative,

Economic motivation in

response to this question refers to an
answer which stated
that the S was trying to make money, with
no mention of

winning or in any way assuming an advantage over
the other
person.

Any statement which expressed or implied the idea

of winning or doing better than the other was
assigned to
the competitive category.

Cooperation was interpreted as

any statement which incorporated the idea of sharing

equally.

Review of Table 18 suggests that the predominant motive operating across subject groups in the selection of

strategy in the PD was the competitive motive.

Though no

significant differences were found between groups on the

behavioral measures of exploitation in the PD (see discussion above),

Ss

'

responses to question one suggest that

Cs tended to perceive themselves as playing most competi-

tively and NSs as

m.ost

cooperatively.

This finding is

consistent with the order of differences, though nonsignificant, of mean rating scores for the three groups ratings
of their own cooperativeness

groups'

(see Table 11)

.

From the C

responses to question one it appears that, of the

three groups, their choices in the PD were least motivated

90

by economic gain.
The question asked in item two of
the questionnaire
was,

"What did YOU think the other person
was doing in

the decision making situation?"

The replies to this

question are categorized in Table 19.

in addition to the

three motives already identified in response
to question
one,

for question two "color choosing" and
"playing it

safe" occurred frequently enough to be treated as
separate

motives.

Color choosing simply refers to a

S

writing

that his partner was picking red or blue with no attempt
to elaborate the interpersonal implications of that choice.

As can be seen from Table 19 the most frequent motive

assigned to the partners in the PD vas cooperation.
the average,

way.

t

On

2C% of the Ss in each group responded this

However, a large percent of Ss, on tne average 18%,

attributed a competitive orientation to their partner,
which does not speak well for the £s

'

comprehension of

the simulated other's unconditionally cooperative strategy.

Question three asked the following, depending on the

subject's immediate-delay choice:

money today?"

"VJhat

'What m,ade you take your

made you wait a week for your money?"

Summarized replies to this question are presented in Table
20 under the two major headings of Imir;ediate and Delayed
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gratification.
the

inTTr.ediate

The motives identified as operating for

choice Ss were present need, money not

worth it, and negative attitude toward waiting.

For delay

choice Ss, the motives were no present need, economic gain,
and positive attitude towards waiting.

Present or no pre-

sent need refer to an explicit statement of need or its

absence.

For example, an imjnediate choice

3^

saying he

needed cigarettes, or a delay S saying he did not need

anything now.

Positive or negative attitude towards

waiting applies to those answers which were more abstractly
or philosophically stated, and which seemed to represent
a general attitude toward waiting.

An example of such a

response would be an immediate choice

"Tomorrow isn't promised."

saying that,

The predominant motive for the

immediate choice Ss was present need, 60% of the Ss on the

average expressing this m.otive.

For the delay

dominant motives were economic gain
present need

(44.7% of the

S^s)

.

(45/o

_3s,

of the ^s)

the pre-

and no

For both immediate and

delay choice decisions, need orientation occurred as a
strong determinant of choice.

It is possible that immed-

iate vs. delay Ss may be differentiated in terms of their
need tolerance, Cs and PSs exhibiting the greater need

tolerance

94

In Table 21 are presented the percent of Ss in
each

motive category expressed in response to question
four
which asked, depending on the S's risk choice:
you decide to spin the dial?"

spinning the dial?"

"What made

"What decided you against

The motives for the high risk condi-

tion were economic gain and positive attitude about gambling,

and,

for the low risk condition,

fear of losing,

recognition of poor risk, negative attitude towards
gambling, and poor risk and fear of losing combined.

Recognition of poor risk refers to a statement such as
"The odds were too great."

high risk

S^s

The predominant motive for

was econom.ic gain,

this attitude.

50% of the Ss expressing

For the low risk condition, recognition

of poor risk was the chief motive, 45% of the

coming under this heading.

S^s

'

responses
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CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION
The question of whether the concept
of sociopathy

represents a meaningful diagnostic category
was the
stimulus for the present research.

To date, acceptance

of the existence and dimensions of sociopathy
has been

based almost exclusively on clinical observation
and case
study.

Given the lack of objective measurement inherent

in clinical observation,

the need for more rigorous ex-

perimental verification was clear.

The present study was

an attempt in that direction.

Egocentricitv
One of the cardinal traits associated with the socio-

path is the superficiality of his emotions.

well as professional writings
McCord,

(Cleckley,

The media, as

1964; McCord &

1964),

call attention to the self-centeredness of

the sociopath.

He is consistently depicted as a ruthless

individual concerned with meeting his own needs at the
expense of, or through the manipulation of others.

The

title of Truman Capote's book In Cold Blood probably best

captures the fear that the lay person associates with the
possible consequences of the sociopath's incapacity to
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to feel towards others.

Given the vivid and ubiquitous picture of the sociopath's extreme egocentrism, hypothesis
some confidence.

1

was proffered with

It stated that sociopaths would be signi-

ficantly more exploitative than normals in their game
playing strategies in the prisoner's dilem,ma.
esis was not confirmed.

The hypoth-

No significant differences were

found between the groups.

The PSs were, hov;ever, con-

sistently more exploitative over the course of play than
either the NSs or controls.

This finding suggests

(albeit

weakly) that primary sociopaths may be more egocentric

than normals, and that a difference may exist between

primary sociopaths and neurotic sociopaths in egocentricity.

This would be consistent with theoretical form.u-

lations.

It has been argued by Karpman

(1943b)

and

Schmauk (1987) that neurotic sociopaths resemble primary
sociopaths only in the gross aspects of their behavior
and that the primary sociopath is the "true" sociopath.

Particular attention was paid to the strategy choices
made on trials one and two of the PD

.

Trial one was of

special interest because it best reflected a S's initial

reaction to nis partner and the payoff matrix.

As such,

it was a measure of S's initial trust or suspicion of

.
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his partner.

Trial two, in turn, following the feedback

that the partner would cooperate, served as a measure of
the trustworthiness of the subject.

No significant differ-

ences were found between the groups for these two trials,
but on both trials the sociopaths exhibited a greater

tendency toward exploitativeness
The behavior of the groups on the second matrix,
with greater absolute values, once again showed no significant differences in exploitativeness, though again
there was a slight margin in the predicted direction for
the sociopaths.

On all the measures of exploitativeness, no significant differences were found between the three groups.

On

nearly all the measures, however, sociopaths tended to
evidence small margins of greater exploitativeness.

Additional perspective may be gained by considering
the present results within the context of related litera-

ture.

In interpreting the results,

it is important to

consider the experimental circumstances within which they
were obtained.
paradigm,

Because the PD was used as an experimental

it is necessary to assess its discriminative

sensitivity to personality and attitudinal variables and
the nature of these variables.
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In a review article, Vinacke

(1969)

pointed out that

differences have been found in PD
play for sex. age, culture,

family background, psychopathology

and traits differences.

,

and attitudes

Of particular interest here are

the differences that have been found
in attitudinal and

personality variables.

Wrightsman (1966), using scores

on a personality inventory called the
Philosophies of

Human Nature Scale, found that persons who believed
human
nature to be altruistic, trustworthy, and independent
behaved in a two-trial version of the PD in more trusting
ways than did Ss with unfavorable attitudes toward numan
nature.

On trial one, Ss were told that their choice

would be revealed to their partner before he chose.
these conditions, the

Under

with the more favorable attitudes

S^s

toward others chose cooperation more frequently, indica-

ting their trust in the other person.
(1963)

and Lutzker

(1960)

McClintock et al.

have both looked at the poli-

tically related attitudinal variable of internationalism

-

isolationism as a predictor of cooperative behavior in the
PD.

Internationalism

-

isolationism was assessed by a 36

item scale developed by Lutzker.

An internationalist was

defined as one who trusts other nations, is willing to
cooperate with them, perceives international agencies such
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as the U.N. as deterrents to war,

and considers inter-

national tensions reducible by mediation.

An isolationist

was defined as one who demands national strength
and might
in lieu of international mediation,

and who does not en-

courage commerce or transactions with other nations.

Lutzker (1960) employed three groups of Ss isolationists,
internationalists, and controls in a 30 trial free play
"chicken" variant of the PD

.

Ke found that international-

ists made significantly more cooperative responses than

isolationists and that Cs cooperated as often as did
internationalists.

Lutzker concluded that the differences

found between the two experimental groups were due to the

greater uncooperat iveness of the isolationists.
et al.

(1963),

McClintock

also using the "chicken" form of the PD, had

two groups, internationalists and isolationists, play 60

trials of the PD against three experimenter programmed
strategies:

cooperative.

85% cooperative, 50% cooperative, and 15%

McClintock found that isolationists were

more competitive than internationalists and that strategy
did not significantly affect behavior.

Terhune (1968) in-

vestigated the relationship of dominance on the achievement,

affiliation, and power motive, as determined by

TAT stories, on cooperation in the PD

.

Terhune

's

Ss
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played three one-trial gai.es and a
30 trial
in payoff.

gai.e

varying

He found that high need achievers
were the

most cooperative regardless of

garre

matrix.

Need affil-

iators were highly cooperative when
playing with a matrix
which was structured so that defection
from a cooperative

strategy was attended by a large loss if both
players
chose uncooperatively, and by little gain
if the defector
was successful in his strategy change.

Persons high on

need for power ^^re most uncooperative and tried
to exploit their partner more than the other groups.

In

Marlowe's (1963) study on psychological needs and cooperation, first year m.edical students played a PD game for

30 trials against a confederate who made an unconditionally

cooperative choice on every trial.

Marlowe's results in-

dicated that cooperative Ss scored higher on need abasement and deference.

Psychological needs were measured

by the Heilbrun adaptation of the Gough ACL.
(1960)

Deutsch's

study focused on the relationship of trusting and

trustworthy behavior in the PD with scores on the F
scale of authoritarianism.

Subjects played the game two

times, each time presumably with a different person.

The first time, S s

second

tim^e,

'

choices were announced first.

The

the other person's choice was announced first.

A significant relationship was found between 3s' scores on
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the P scale and game behavior.

Subjects low on the F

scale made more trusting and
trustworthy choices than high
scoring subjects.

From examination of the studies cited
above, a
composite profile of the cooperative
and

competitive PD

game player can be extrapolated.

The cooperative individ-

ual tends to need or desire to establish
and maintain

friendly relations with others.
in the basic altruism of others.

He trusts and believes
He tends to be more

intellectually sophisticated and motivated to achievement with high standards of excellence.

The competitive

individual tends to hold a cynical and unfavorable

attitude toward human nature, is aggressive, and
dependent.

is

in-

In his dealings with others he prefers to

be in a position of power and strength, needing to gain
and exert control over them.

Given the above descriptions of the cooperative and
competitive game player, and the current conceptions of
sociopathy, one might have expected sociopaths to manifest more competitive behavior than normals.

This ex-

pectation also seemed reinforced by the fact that the

personality differences found in the above PD games were
assessed principally by paper and pencil tests, while the

measure of sociopathy used in this study was based on a
solid foundation of behavioral criteria, nam.ely,
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criminalism and recidivism.

That no differences in

exploitativeness were found suggests the
possibility that
clinical description has exaggerated
the role of egocen-

tricity in sociopathy.

Additional support for the position that
sociopaths

may not be as exploitative as currently
believed may be
found readily.

m

one study

(Berger & Tedeschi,

delinquents played the PD game.

1969)

While a delinquent pop-

ulation as such is a more heterogenous grouping
than PSs
and NSs combined,

there are no doubt more sociopaths among

delinquents than am.ong normals.
and Tedeschi-

s

For this reason, Berger

findings have a direct bearing on the

issue of exploitativeness and sociopathy.

Their subjects

were 10-13 year old delinquents, dependent children, and
normals.

They played a 50 trial game against a 50% coop-

erative random strategy.
_Ss

The

gam.e

was modified by giving

the option after every seventh trial of "zapping" the

other by taking $10.00 from the other at a cost to them-

selves of $2, $5, $8, or $11.00 depending on cell assignments.

Subjects played for "M & M" candy on a one "M &

M" for $1,00 basis.

No main effect for groups and coop-

erative strategy selections was found.

There were also

no differences related to the frequency of exercising
the option of punishing the other.

The only finding
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which suggested that delinquents were

i.ore

exploitative

was their tendency to be more competitive
than their

normal counterparts when the dummy other
cooperated on
the trial preceding the "zap" option.

Sutler's study (1970)

is

directly related to the

present study and in a number of ways complements
it.

Sutker's investigation, like the present one, tested
ex-

perimentally the clinical description of the sociopath
as being insensitive to the feelings of others.

A vi-

carious conditioning paradigm was used to test her

hypothesis of reduced sensitivity in sociopaths.

Unlike

the present investigation which worked with incarcerated

sociopaths, Sutker's study employed a group of uninstitu-

tionalized sociopaths whose

nam.es

had been obtained from

several mental health agencies as having been diagnosed
as sociopathic personality within a year's time.

In

addition to the diagnosis of sociopathic personality, an

elevated T-score on the Pd scale of the MMPI was required
for inclusion in the sociopathic group.

The results of her study indicated that there were
no differences between sociopaths and non-sociopaths in

basal skin resistance.

Contrary to prediction, she

found that sociopaths reacted with significantly greater

GSR conductance changes to all stimuli across trials.
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The sociopaths, ho^'ever, responded
with less anticipation
of shocks to the stooge than when they
observed the actual

discomfort of the stooge associated with the
specifically
shocked stimulus nuirber.

On Sutker's other measure of

interpersonal insensitivity

,

the relinq^aishing of quarters,

no significant differences were found between
groups.

The

direction of differences, however, were in the favor of
the sociopaths being more altruistic.

This was also true

for sociopaths' answers to a post-session questionnaire on

which they evidenced a stronger dislike for the other in-

dividual's discomfort.
Sutker interpreted her findings of greater change in
GSR activity for the sociopaths as evidence of vicarious
instigation, but she was reluctant to conclude that the

sociopaths empathized with the other person.

She stated

that it is uncertain whether the sociopaths experienced

emotions similar or dissimilar to the stooge.

That the

sociopaths reacted significantly more than non-sociopaths
was interpreted in accord with the position of Schacter &

Latane (1S54) that the sociopath overresponds to exciting

situations in general.

Sutker explained ner findings of

greater altruism in sociopaths as probably originating
from their expertise in social manipulation, and knowing
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that they were being monitored, they gave up their quarter!
for the socially desirable effect.

It appears to the

present investigator that Sutker's explanation of her

unexpected findings is in itself a refutation of the

characteristic of sociopathy under investigation.

Basic

to the concept of sociopathy is the assumption that socio-

paths are indifferent to the needs of others and are

lacking in the need for social approval.

Because it was

of no advantage to the sociopaths to act in a socially

desirable manner, imputing this motive to them is tantamount to describing them as not sociopathic in the tradi-

tionally-described sense.
While the present investigator is

av;are of the

haz-

ards involved in accepting the null hypothesis that there
are no differences in exploitativeness between sociopaths
and normals, the weight of accumulating evidence nonethe-

less suggests that no differences in exploitativeness, or

differences of small magnitude, may exist between sociopaths and normals.

It is the responsibility of future

research to grapple with the question of whether a re-

conceptualization or abrogation of this aspect of the
concept of sociopathy is in order.
signs should,

Future research de-

ideally, be more reality bound and offer
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a large and clear cut advantage for
exploitative behavior.

Delay of Gratification
Observational impressions of delinquents and
sociopaths suggest their inability to delay
gratification.

Life styles which are characterized by lack of
persist-

ence of effort, dropping out of school, poor job
performance, and lack of direction seem to provide ample
evi-

dence for the sociopath's inability to delay gratification.
For delinquents, clinical observations have been consistent

with research findings.

Mischel (1961) performed an in-

vestigation of delay behavior with delinquent and non-

delinquent Trinidadian Negroes aged 12 to 14.

He used

three measures of delay of gratification, and found his

non-delinquents chose the delay option significantly more
frequently.

Based on Mischel

's

findings and clinical descriptions

of the sociopath, hypothesis

2

stated that normal controls

would exhibit a greater preference for delayed gratification than sociopaths.
2

only for the NSs.

The present data support hypothesis
The PSs demonstrated a capacity for

delay behavior equal to that of the controls.

Some

support for the present finding that subgroups of a delinquent population are not equatable in their delay

.
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behavior comes
(1971)

frora the

research of Erikson & Roberts

who worked with two groups of
institutionalized

delinquent males matched for age, IQ, and
length of
institutionalization.

The experimental group of delin-

quents consisted of boys who had chosen to live
in a

special cottage and attend public school even though
this
choice was made with the understanding that it v;ould
delay their release from the institution.

The groups were

compared on a verbal measure of delay of gratification,
as well as on measures of foresight and planning ability,

impulsiveness, internal vs. external control, and adjustment ratings.

To determine delaying capacity each boy

was asked the following question:

"A boy won $1,000 in a

contest, what do you think he did with it?"

The question

was scored on whether the money was spent immediately or
not

Erikson and Robert's data revealed that a significantly greater number of the experimental group of delinquents responded with

ansv^/ers

would delay spending the money.

indicating that they
The experimental group

delinquents were less impulsive and more internally
controlled than the C group, but no differences

'ftere

found in measures of foresight and planning ability or
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adjustment ratings.

These findings of no group differ-

ences in measures of foresight and planning
ability or

adjustment ratings are of particular interest
since the

inability to delay gratification is often imputed
from
the presence or absence of these very
qualities.

That

the groups were differentiated on behavioral and
verbal

measures of delay, and not on planning, foresight and
adjustment, suggests that these variables should be kept

conceptually apart.

It is possible that PSs are mis-

takenly thought to be deficient in delaying capacity

because of their poor judgment, adjustment, foresight
and planning ability.

It is unfortunate that Erikson and

Roberts did not compare their experimental group of delinquents'

group.

verbal delay behavior against a normal control

It would have been instructive to see the degree

and direction of differences.

The generalizability of the findings of the present

study are limited by the present experimental constraints

Only one delay period, one week,

v;as

were institutionalized and controls

used: sociopaths
^-^re

not-

and the

incentives for a delayed choice were only roughly comparable for the sociopaths and controls.

Future research

should consider different experim.ental situations, and
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different periods of delay and incentives for
delay.
As researchers

vvell

know, correlation per se does

not necessarily ircply a cause and effect
relationship

between variables.

With this in

examination of the

raind,

correlates of delay behavior may, nevertheless, be helpful in fostering a more complete understanding of the

mechanisms of delayed gratification.

A particularly

promising correlate as revealed by research has been time

orientation or future

tim.e

perspective.

One of the

early studies demonstrating a relationship between future
time perspective and delay behavior was done by Mischel
& Metzner

(1962)

.

Their measure of future time perspec-

tive was a series of questions pertaining to the age and
time of occurrence of certain events identified by chil-

dren aged

5

to 12.

The measure of delay was a simple

choice preference under five different delay intervals,

Mischel and Metzner found that delay Ss made more m.oderate
and realistic estimates of future events, -vhereas imme-

diate Ss made either extremely short or extrem.ely long

estimates.

Having established a relationship between time orientation and delayed gratification, it should follow that

delinquents should be more extreme in their time

Ill

perspective.

Barndt & Johnson (1955) studied

tation in delinquents and non-delinquents.

tinie

orien-

Their Ss

ranged in age from approximately 15 years
to 17 years and

were matched on age,

IQ,

academic achievement, and SES.

Future time perspective was measured through the
use of
stories obtained from all Ss in response to verbal
instructions which included only the beginning of the story.

The

stories were recorded and scored in terms of the length
of time covered by the action of the stories.

The inves-

tigators found that delinquent boys produced significantly
shorter time spans for their stories.

Siegman (1981),

working with delinquents and men in the Israeli army,
compared their future time perspective using a procedure
similar to that used by Mischel & Metzner (1362)

.

Sub-

jects were asked to name a number of events that referred
to things which they may do or which may happen to them
in the future.

They were then asked to indicate

they would be at the occurrence of each event.

v;hat

age

Future

time perspective was then determined from the ages indi-

cated.

In accord with previous research,

the delinquent

group obtained significantly lower future time perspective scores.

More recently, Klineberg (1963) studied future tine

perspective and preference for delayed
reward, breaking

down future time perspective into
three components:
"Length of time perspective" was determined
by the time
span of the action in TAT stories and
the median age of
Ss'

predictions when asked to guess how old they
would be

at the occurrence of a number of different
personal

future events.

"Everyday concern with future events" was

based on a measure of the proportion of references
to
events in the past, present or future.

"Sense of reality

of future events" was a measure designed to reflect
the

degree to which the subject conceived of the future as
an orderly unfolding of events in logical and predictable

successions.

Klineberg's Ss were youngsters ranging from

10 years to approximately 13 years.

of delayed gratification,

verbal measure.

He used two measures

a behavioral measure and a

Though Klineberg did not work directly

with delinquents, he pointed out that research has shown
the delinquent to have a foreshortened perspective on
the future.

He underscored the fact that this future

orientation is responsible, at least in part, for the

delinquent's impulsivity, but he also stressed that
where events are only a short time away the inability to

envision events many years

av;ay

should be less likely to

.
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be relevant.

m

this regard, he found no significant

relationship betv^en preference for delay
behavior on both
of his measures and length of time
perspective,

a finding

which does not agree with Mischel & Metzner
(1962)

Significant relationships were found between
preferences
for delayed reward and more realistic and
consistent out-

looks on the personal future as a whole, and
greater

everyday preoccupation with future events.
Some of the questions pertaining to the relationships
of sociopathy, delay of gratification, and time orienta-

tion could undoubtedly be tied together within a research

design incorporating all these factors.

Also of practical

importance would be a research project which would explore
the possibilities of increasing delay behavior in socio-

paths by changing their time orientation.

Risk Taking

Hypothesis

3

stated that sociopaths, as compared to

normals, would exhibit greater risk taking behavior.

hypothesis was confirmed only for the PSs.

The

The relation-

ships between NSs, PSs, and Cs in risk taking are equivocal

because of a problem of interpretation introduced by the

experimental design, the nature of wnich was elaborated
in the preceding chaptei

,

Briefly stated, a high risk
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Choice was effected by S's
o.ior choice of i..ediate
or
delayed gratification, and
groups, with the exception
of
the PSs and Cs, were not
equatable in their in^ediate
vs.
delay choices. After roughly
comparing the relative proportions of ss Choosing delayed
gratification for the NSs
against the PSs and Cs with the
nui^ber of Ss in each
group choosing high risk, it
appears that the NSs fall

between the Cs and PSs in their
proclivity for high risks.
The three subject groups were
also coiT,pared on their
subjective perception of the degree
of risk involved in
their spinning of the dial.

Subjects'

rating scores in-

dicated that the PSs and NSs perception
of risk was the
same and that the sociopaths saw the
risk involved as

significantly more favorable than did controls.
The present findings of greater risk
taking and sub-

jective underestimation of risk among sociopaths
are con-

sistent with those of Claster (1967)

.

Claster matched a

group of delinquents and non-delinquents on age,
IQ and
race.

A questionnaire was administered which was con-

structed to m>easure S's perception of the risk of arrest
and conviction for the commission of hypothetical
offenses.
It was found that delinquents perceived themselves to be

more imimune from arrest, but no group differences were

.

lis

found for perception of
conviction,

it is important to

note that the delinquents
perceived the-r.selves as irm,une
from arrest in spite of the
fact that many of the:, were

recidivists

HOW do we understand the sociopath's
minimization of
risk?

one possibility is that
underestimation of risk is

related to the sociopath's poor
conditionability of fear
(Hare,

1965; Lykken,

1957; Schmauk,

1970).

Much of tne

recent research with sociopaths has
demonstrated that

they are less anxious generally than
normals, and that,
in comparison to normals,

a fewer number of cues are

capable of eliciting an anxiety or fear
response (Schmauk,
1970)

.

Inherent in the experience of risk is the recog-

nition of the contingency of an unfavorable
outcome,

examples of which might be loss of money or being
arrested
If the sociopath is less emotionally responsive to
the

avers ive consequences of an unfavorable outcome of a risk
situation, he is then more likely to perceive the degree
of risk as less.

Present findings that sociopaths preferred higher
risks than Cs are consistent with the results of a

number of studies dealing with personality correlates of
risk taking.

Cameron & Myers (1966) found that Ss high

.

,
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in exhibitionisit,

(attention getting behavior), aggression,

and dominance tended to prefer bets with
high payoff and

low probabilities of winning.

Scodel and his associates

observed that low risk individuals, in a gambling

(1959)

situation, were higher on measures of fear of failure
and
need for achievement.
(1960)

,

Atkinson, Bastian, Earl, & Litwin

in concordance with Scodel,

showed that high need

for achievement college men, making imaginary bets, pre-

ferred intermediate risks over extreme risks.

iVhile

no

experim,ental measure of need for achievement is available
for delinquents or sociopaths, the face validity for their

being low in need for achievement is extremely strong.
This being so, their preference for high risks in the
present study is in agreement with the relationship
found by Atkinson et al. between risk taking and need for

achievement
Perception of Self and Others
The sociopaths and the norm.al controls did not differ from each other in their mean ratings of the other

person's intelligence, the other's cooperativeness
their own cooperation, and the other's consistency of

strategy choice.

A comparison of the self cooperation

and other's cooperation scores showed that

_Ss

correctly
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perceived the other person as being
more cooperative.
While groups did not differ in
their overall ratings,

correlations between the degree of
exploitat iveness within a group and several of the
ratings did show signifi-

cant relationships.

Both the NSs and Cs evidenced a

significant trend for the

ir.ore

exploitative Ss to accu-

rately label their behavior as less
cooperative than did
the low exploitative subjects.

This relationship was not

found for the PSs, suggesting that PSs may
either be un-

willing or unable to correctly label their
exploitative
behavior.

Inverse correlations between degree of exploitativeness and intelligence of the other person were found for

both the NSs and Cs but not for the PSs.

It appears that

for the NSs and Cs, the more exploitative Ss tended to

devalue the intelligence of the other.
that the high exploitative

S^s

It

seeir.s

likely

may have considered their

partners less intelligent because they permitted themselves to be exploited.

Weakness, or letting oneself be

taken advantage of, may be associated generally with lack
of intelligence.

That PSs did not evidence a significant

relationship between degree of exploitat iveness and
other's intelligence is consistent with their not labeling
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their competitiveness as accurately.
PSs,

High exploitative

tending not to see themselves as exploitative, could

hardly be expected to see the other person as a victim
of exploitation.

The correlations obtained for the relationship be-

tween degree of exploitat iveness and cooperation of the
other v/ere all inverse but nonsignificant, suggesting
that there was a tendency for high exploitative

S^s

to

misperceive their partners behavior as uncooperative.
The mis percept ion that did occur could be understood as
a S^'s defense against admitting that he was exploitative

without provocation.

Projecting uncooperat iveness onto

the other serves as a rationalization for one's own lack
of cooperation.

This finding of high exploitative Ss

perceiving their partners as uncooperative could also be
the result of the high exploitative
of the overall

^^«Drth

S^s

of their partner,

flected, as a negative halo effect,

m

'

general devaluing
and this being rethe rating scores

for cooperation.

Conclusion
In conclusion,

it appears that the well accepted

clinical doctrine of a strong association between sociopathy and egocentricity demands reexamination.

Results

.
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of the present study suggest that there
are little or no

differences betv^en normals and sociopaths
in egocentric
behavior.

Support for this position is found in the
work

of Berger & Tedeschi

(1989)

and of Sutker

(1970)

As regards the capacity to delay gratification,
un-

expected differences

v;ere

found between the neurotic and

primary sociopaths, primary sociopaths tending to delay

gratification more frequently than the neurotic sociopaths
Surprisingly, the delay behavior of the normals and pri-

mary sociopaths was similar.

This is particularly

puzzling when one considers the life styles of sociopaths involved in the study.

All had exhibited behavior

which is generally associated with an incapacity to

delay gratification.

All sociopaths were criminal offen-

ders and recidivists.

It is generally taken for granted

that the inability to follow a life plan or work pro-

ductively is synonoraous with poor delaying capacity.

The

results of the present study suggest that this may not be
so,

or that the relationships between these variables is

more complicated than is presently thought, or that the

experimental measure of delay of gratification was unreliable

.

While PSs

v/ere

more like normals in their delay

.
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behavior than

v;ere NSs,

this relationship was reversed

for risk taking behavior.

Primary sociopaths were

clearly more attracted to high risk contingencies
than
were normals,

and the neurotic sociopaths inclination

to take high risks seemed to fall in-betv.-een
these two

groups

Reserving final judgment on the outcome of future
research,

present results and those of other studies

suggest that a reconceptualization of the concept of

sociopathy may be necessary.

One area of investigation

which appears promising is the further exploration of
the differences between neurotic and primary sociopaths.

Egocentricity, Delay of Gratification,
and Risk

Taking in Sociopaths.

(March 1972)

Sheiaon D. Gluck, B.S., City College
of the City University
of New York

M.S., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Dr. Larry C. Kerpelman

The acceptance of the diagnostic category
of socio-

pathy has been based nearly exclusively on
clinical ob-

servation.

A number of research studies nave been con-

ducted which have focused on anxiety and avoidance
learning in the sociopath, but few studies have put
other
of the putative criteria of scciopathy under the
experi-

mental spotlight.

It was the purpose of this study to

help close this investigative gap and to experimentally
examine three criteria of sociopathy

~

,

two of which -^ere

based on descriptions provided in the writings of Hervey

Cleckley (1964)

,

and the third of which was based on

common sense impressions of the sociopath's life style.

They were:

egocentricity, experimentally phrased as

exploitativeness; inability to delay gratification; and
high risk taking.

Sociopaths were recruited from a reformatory
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population, and noriral controls were
recruited

Philadelphia high schools.
paths
(Cs).

(P3S),

fron,

There were 35 primary socio-

35 neurotic sociopaths

(nSs)

and 35 controls

,

Beyond the obvious distinction of
criminal incar-

ceration, Ss were assigned to their
respective groups

based on their MMPI profiles and Taylor
Manifest Anxiety
Scores

(^LAS)

.

Primary and neurotic sociopaths ^^re

characterized by Pd-Ma profiles, with the neurotic
sociopaths generally scoring higher on the anxiety
scales:

hypochondriasis, depression, hysteria, and psychasthenia.
The NSs were also selected to have higher

f^lAS

scores.

An

attempt was made to match groups for age, funds available,
race, IQ,

and socioeconomic status.

Three major hypotheses were presented,

it was pre-

dicted that sociopaths, as compared with controls, would
exhibit greater exploitat iveness

,

less capacity to delay

gratification, and higher risk taking behavior.
The experimental procedure can be thought of as

divided into four stages, three associated with measuring
the criteria under investigation,

and the fourth with

the administration of a post-experimental rating form and

questionnaire.

For the first phase of the experiment, all Ss

.

.
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participated

m

a

Prisoner's

Dileirtma

(PD)

gaine

.

They ^^re

led to believe that they -were
playing with a partner, but
in reality no partner was present,

against a

lOCPA

and all Ss played

unconditional cooperative strategy.

Rather

than playing for a constant number of trials,
Ss played
the game until an upper limit of $3.00
was approximated.

The proportion of exploitative choices was the
dependent

measure

For the second phase, Ss were given the option of
receiving their earnings immediately, or of receiving them
a week later with a $1.00 bonus

(for inmates, earnings

were redeemable in canteen m.erchandise)
In part three of the study,

S^s

.

were given a chance

to increase their earnings by spinning a dial with the

numbers one to five on it.

The odds involved were ex-

plained and the contingencies for a win or loss made
clear
Finally, a rating form, asking for valuations of the

partner's intelligence, own and other's cooperation, and
other's consistency of choice, was administered along
with a questionnaire giving the

an opportunity to ex-

press his reasons for his particular decisions.

Predictions concerning exploitat iveness were not

.
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supported,

on a number of measures of
exploitativeness

obtained within the context of the
PD, sociopaths exhibited sir.all margins of exploitativeness.
There .vere,
however, no significant differences
between the three

groups on any of the rr,easures.

In the light of relevant

research, these findings were taken
to indicate that

there is not a strong association between
egocentricity
and sociopathy.

Implications for future research focused

on the desirability of using more reality
bound experi-

mental situations to test this reputed
characteristic of

sociopaths
The data for delaying gratification supported
hypoth-

esis

2

only in part.

As anticipated, NSs exhibited less

delaying -apacity than Cs, but, unexpectedly, PSs exhibited preferences for delayed gratification equal to
that of the Cs,

This finding was discussed with regard

to the limits of its generalizability and possible

directions for continued research.

The importance of

varying delay intervals and incentives for delay was
stressed.
The results for risk taking did not allow for easy

interpretation because of a
design.

'-'^akness

in the experimental

Primary sociopaths did exhibit significantly
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greater risk taking than Cs but the
relationships for NSs
and the other two groups were less
clear.

Essentially,

based on post hoc examination of the
data and the fact
that sociopaths rated their perception
of risk as nore

favorable than Cs, it was concluded that
sociopaths

underestimate degree of risk and exhibit a preference
for higher risks.

No differences were found between groups on mean

rating scores for intelligence of the other person,

cooperation of the other person, cooperation of self,
and the other's consistency, but differences

'vere

found between groups for the degree of exploitat iveness
and rating scores.

The findings of the present study raise doubt as to
the general validity of the traditional conceptions of

sociopathy.

Dividing the disorder into two subtypes was

shown to be m^eaningful, and the importance of further

research was em.phasized.
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Experimental Instructions
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INSTRUCTIONS
It is part of the experiment
that you do not know

Who your partner is.

Do not speak during the
experiment

and do not try to find out who
your partner is.

This experiment is being run
under the direction of
the University of Massachusetts.
the experiment will be reported
to

Nothing you do during
(the name of the

agency goes here)
The purpose of this experiment is to
study decision

making where your decision has an effect
on the other
person as well as yourself.

There are two of you who are going to make
a series
of decisions.

The decisions you make will determine how

much money you make

This is what each of you will do.
of you a red card and a blue card.

You see in front

Each time that light

in front of you goes on you will pick either the red
or

blue card and you

v/ill

slot in the partition.

pass the card to

m.e

through the

It will help to make things clear

if you look at the chart posted in front of you.

Notice that if you pick the red card two things can
happen.

If you pick red and the other person also picks

.
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red,

you get 10^ and he gets 10^.

if you pick red and

he picks the blue card, you
get 5^ and he gets

15>z^.

Suppose you pick the blue card,
again two things can
happen,

if you pick blue and the other
person also picks

blue, you get

and ne gets 2^.

3^'

picks red you get

15jzf

and he gets

if you pick blue and he
5;2f.

You will keep all the money you make.

You won't

get money after each trial but I will keep
track of how

much you have made.
will receive

At the end of the experiment you

(scrip; a canteen slip,

s

is shown scrip;

canteen slip.) showing the amount of money you earned.

You will give this to (one of the secretaries; the
canteen)
who will give you your (money; canteen)
The experiment will continue for approximately

twenty minutes.

O.K. now

^ve

are ready to begin.

When

you see that light in front of you go on it means that

both of you are to pick the red or blue card.

Once you

have made your cnoice put the card through the slot in
the partition.

After a few seconds you will receive a

card telling you how much money you have made.

The red

or blue card will be returned to you at this point.

^«Vhen

you have seen how mucn you have made on the payoff card

return it to me through the slot and get ready for the
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next trial.

You will be told every few trials
how

:.uch

total money you have made.
(The Ss played the game)

Now I'm going to give you a chance
to increase your
earnings.

I'm going to ask you to make a choice
on

whether you would like the money you have
earned today
or a week from today.

If you like, you can have your

money immediately after the experin^ent is over;
or if
you wait a ^veek I will add a one dollar bonus to the

amount you earned today.

Indicate your preference by

checking the appropriate box on that slip of paper and
pass the slip through the slot in the partition.
(At this juncture a new matrix was introduced)

Please note the new amounts of money involved.
(The game was played for one trial)
(The

_S

was now seen in a different room)

Now I'm going to give you another chance to increase
your earnings.

(Dial is presented.)

spin the dial only once.

you $15.

If you get a "5" I will pay

If you do not get a "5" you will lose all that

you earned up to now (If
that).

If you want you may

The odds are 4 to

v/ould you like to do?

gets a $1.00 bonus he keeps
1

against getting a "5."

What
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(After the S n^ade his choice
he received a rating

form and a questionnaire to
fill out)

.

APPEMDIX B

Rating Forin

.

.

,
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I

would like you to rate the other
person's in-

telliqence

(how smart or bright you think
he is)

cooperation (how willing he was to make
choices that
would allow both of you to earn equal
amounts of noney,
and not try to earn more than you)

,

and consistency

(how

often he made the same choice on each
trial)
Place a check mark above the number that
gives the

rating you want to make.

For example, if you feel that

your partner is very intelligent, you would
place a check
above the number "7."

if you feel that your partner is

not intelligent, you would place a check mark
above the

number "1."

if you feel he is average, you would place

a check above the number "4."

Place your check marks above, not between, the

numbers

INTELLIGENCE
(How smart or bright you think he is)
^^ot

Intelligent

1

2

3

4 5

6 7

Very Intelligent
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COOPERATION
(HOW willing he was to i.ake
choices that would allow both
Of you to earn equal a,.ounts
of xnoney. and not try to
earn more than

^

you)

Very Cooperative

12

4

3

5

6 7

Not Cooperative

(How willing you '^re to r.ake
choices that would allow
both of you to earn equal amounts of
money, and not t^v
to earn more than him)

Not Cooperative

1

2

3

4

5

Very Cooperati ve

6_7

CONSISTENCY
(How often he made the same choice on each
trial

Very Consistent

12

3

4 5 6

7

Not Consistent

APPENDIX C

Questionnaire Form
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I

would like you to ans^ver the questions below
in your

own words.
a)

What

^vere

you trying to do in the decision making

situation with the other person?

b)

VJhat

did you think the other person was doing in the

decision making situation?

c)

What made you take your money today; what made you

wait a week for your money?

d)

What made you decide to spin the dial; what decided

you against spinning the dial?

e)

What did you think your chances of getting a "5" on

the dial were?
(Check one.)

Excellent

Good

Fair

Not Good

Bad

APPENDIX D

Analyses of Variance
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TABLE 22

Summary of Analyses of Variance for Group
Matching
Variables: Age, IQ, SES, and Funds

Source of Variation

df

3S

MS

F

R

Age

Between Groups

2

244. 353

Within Groups

102

249. 560

Total

104

493 . 953

122.177 49.930

.01

2.447

IQ

Between Groups

180. 348

90.174

Within Groups

102 11704. 900

114.754

Total

104 11885. 245

2

.786

n

SES

Between Groups

110. 867

55.434

Within Groups

102 33946. 801

332. S12

Total

104 34057. 670

2

.167

n
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TABLE 22 (contd.)

Funds

Between Groups

2

183.985

91.992

Within Groups

102

2224.715

21.811

Total

104

2408.700

4.218 .025

Note.— All significance levels are less than
values indicated, £ >.io indicated by the
letter

the p
n.
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TABLE
SuiToiiary

23

of Analyses of Variance for

mPI-Basad Variables

Source of Variation

df

SS

MS

L Scale

Between Groups

2

10.413

5.207

Within Groups

102

467.428

4.583

Total

104

477.841

1.136

n

F Scale

Between Groups

2

137.192

68.600

Within Groups

102

1108.854

10.371

Total

104

1246.046

6.310

.01

K Scale

Between Groups

2

258.370

129.435

Within Groups

102

1340.453

13.142

Total

104

1599.323

9.350

.01
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TABLE 23

(contd.)

Hs Scale

Between Groups

2

249.726

124.863

Within Groups

102

690.112

6.766

Total

104

939.837

18.455 .01

D Scale

Between Groups

2

425.846

212.923

Within Groups

102

1087.996

10.667

Total

104

1513.842

19.S62 .01

Hy Scale

Between Groups

2

701.536

350.768

Within Groups

102

1067.309

10.464

Total

104

1768.345

33.522 .01

Pd Scale

Between Groups

2

2005.723

Within Groups

102

804.797

Total

104

2810.521

1002. S62 127.103

7.390

.01
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TABLE 23

(contd.)

Mf Scale
Between Groups

2

62.524

31.262

Within Groups

102

2055.710

20.154

Total

104

2118.233

1.551

n

Pa Scale

Between Groups

2

120.925

60.462

Within Groups

102

653.198

6.404

Total

104

774.123

9.442 .01

Pt Scale

Between Groups

2

515.093

257.549

Within Groups

102

1177.083

11.540

Total

104

1692.181

22.313 .01

Sc Scale

Between Grouos

66. 123

33.061
14.432

Within GrouDs

102

1472.050

Total

104

1538.173

2.291

n

148

TABLE 23

(contd.)

Ma Scale
Betv^een Groups

2

360.809

180.405

Within Groups

102

841.427

8.249

'^ot^l

104

1202.236

21.870 .01

Si Scale

Bet^veen Groups

2

722.496

361. 248

Within Groups

IQ2

4301.301

42.170

Total

104

5023.797

8.567 .01

Total Anxiety Score

Between Groups

34390.801

17195.398

Within Groups

102 29315.250

287.404

Total

104 63706.051

2

59.830 .01

Manifest Anxiety Score
Between Groups

2

1849.208

924.604

Within Groups

102

2046.171

20.061

Total

104

3S95.380

—

46.091 .01

Note. All significance levels are less than the £
values indicated. _d >.1G is indicated by the letter

